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INTRODUCTION 
As the Huns rampaged across the Eurasian Steppe,1 Gothic tribes 
amassed along the eastern bank of the Danube River, hoping to obtain 
passage to and protection from the Roman Empire.2 Asylum was granted, 
but the sanctuary soon became a hellish prison as famine inundated the 
settlements.3 In this time of desperation, it is believed that Gothic parents’ 
only option to avoid starvation was to barter their children for dog meat.4 
The fact that Roman officials participated in and enforced these 
“agreements” only added to the hopelessness of the humanitarian tragedy.5 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by PARKER SMITH. 
 1. See generally Peter Heather, The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire 
in Western Europe, ENG. HIST. REV., Feb. 1995, at 4–41 (discussing the activity 
of the Huns in the fourth and fifth centuries as well as the impact of the resulting 
barbarian migrations and invasions on the Western Roman Empire). 
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. See HERWIG WOLFRAM, HISTORY OF THE GOTHS 119 (Thomas J. Dunlap 
trans., Univ. Cal. Press 1998). 
 4. See MICHAEL KULIKOWSKI, ROME’S GOTHIC WARS 130–31 (2007). 
 5. See id. 




Discontent among the Gothic people could not be contained, and the Empire 
soon had its first taste of the barbarian uprisings that would one day re-
shape the political order of Western Europe.6  
Such “agreements” are shocking—if not utterly repulsive—to the 
Western world today, and thus slavery as a legal institution is explicitly 
outlawed.7 But slavery is only one—albeit a most extreme—example of 
agreements that shock the conscience,8 and even legally enforceable 
agreements can invoke moral condemnation. Modern contempt for 
agreements that trade fundamental rights for basic necessities runs deeper 
than the letter of the law. Society is concerned not only with adherence to 
the law as it is written or the competence of the law to address today’s 
problems, but, more fundamentally, the legitimacy of the law itself. 
Like the Roman enforcement of slave contracts, the proliferation of 
certain agreements today can have profound consequences for a legal 
system’s legitimacy. Although these consequences may arouse narrow 
policy concerns—such as economic efficiency, individual autonomy, 
fairness, social stability, and political pragmatism—more fundamental 
problems can arise. Most notably, the legal problems associated with 
certain agreements not only call into question the legitimacy of their 
enforcement but, more importantly, the legitimacy of the governing 
authority that does the enforcement. In this sense, the Gothic plight 
illustrates an important lesson for government that was later expressed by 
the social contract theorists.  
As social contract theorists emphasize, “[t]here will always be a great 
difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society.”9 The key 
point to this lesson is that force alone cannot bring about a duty, at least in 
any meaningful sense of the word.10 Instead, as social contract theorists 
                                                                                                             
 6. See Heather, supra note 1, at 41. 
 7. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”). 
 8. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis 
of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 265, 290 (1999). 
 9. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, in THE BASIC 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 147 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987) 
(1762). 
 10. See id. at 143 (“Let us suppose for a moment that there is such a thing as 
this alleged right [of the strongest]. I maintain that all that results from it is an 
inexplicable mish-mash. For once force produces the right, the effect changes 
places with the cause. . . . As soon as one can disobey with impunity, one can do 
so legitimately . . . .”). 




claim, all legitimate authority is derived from the sincere consent of the 
governed.11 This idea is applicable to the relations between a people and 
its government as well as the relations among the people themselves.12 
Consent has been seen as an essential feature of contractual obligations 
since the time of the Romans.13 Although the nature of consent is debated, 
it remains central to modern contract theory.14 The importance of consent to 
modern contract theory can be problematic because it is often difficult to 
determine whether a person has in fact consented to an agreement through 
her actions, which may be misleading for a number of reasons. Thus, legal 
systems must grapple with the challenge of ensuring the reliability of the 
objective manifestation of consent if consent is to remain a realistic 
foundation of contract law. 
The bargain has been seen historically as a safeguard to the reliability 
of the objective manifestation of consent;15 however, many recognize that 
today most consumer contracts do not involve anything that resembles a 
meaningful bargain.16 Instead, they are “adhesion contracts” that are 
“standard form printed contracts prepared by one party and submitted to the 
other on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.”17 These contracts are ubiquitous in the 
modern life of a consumer, who often inadvertently manifests consent to be 
bound by extremely onerous terms with the mere click of the mouse or 
stroke of the pen. A question thus arises: how should legal systems cope 
with the death of the bargain as the traditional indicia of reliability for the 
objective manifestation of mutual assent? 
Although common law jurisdictions have developed the doctrine of 
unconscionability to answer this question,18 Louisiana’s civil law has yet to 
develop a systematic way of addressing the concerns surrounding adhesion 
                                                                                                             
 11. See id. at 144–45; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, in 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 
154–55 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690). 
 12. The lack of sincere consent in the arrangement suggests slavery—like 
tyranny—is inherently illegitimate. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 9, at 144–45. 
 13. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 563–65 (1990). 
 14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1981). 
 15. See id. § 17. 
 16. See, e.g., Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (“An 
adhesion contract is a contract drafted unilaterally by a business enterprise and 
forced upon an unwilling and often unknowing public for services that cannot 
readily be obtained elsewhere. An adhesion contract is generally not bargained 
for, but is imposed on the public for a necessary service on a take or leave it basis.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 17. Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965). 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 




contracts.19 Thus, scholars have asked whether the doctrine would be 
useful in Louisiana.  
When answering the question of whether the doctrine of 
unconscionability fits well with Louisiana’s civil law system, scholars have 
taken a functional approach—looking to the legal system in practice and 
testing the doctrine of unconscionability against other legal institutions that 
may serve to police adhesion contracts.20 The question for these scholars is 
whether the traditional tools of the civil law can serve the same purpose the 
doctrine of unconscionability serves,21 which is essentially to ensure 
procedural safeguards in the bargaining process that preserve the reliability 
of the objective manifestation of mutual assent.22 Thus, this approach 
focuses on the narrow policy concerns surrounding adhesion contracts 
rather than broader policy concerns associated with the legitimacy of 
governmental action in general. In short, the functional approach essentially 
tests proposed solutions to legal problems in a legal vacuum. 
The major advantage of the functional approach is its practicality. The 
functional approach “understand[s] institutions through their relation to 
problems.”23 Thus, this approach focuses on pragmatism, rather than 
theoretical cohesiveness,24 and allows the comparative law scholar to tailor 
                                                                                                             
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
 20. See infra Part II.B. Despite some heterogeneity, the functional method of 
comparative law has some general characteristics. Ralf Michaels, The Functional 
Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
342 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (“Functionalist 
comparatists agree on some important elements. First, functionalist comparative 
law is factual, it focuses not on rules but on their effects, not on doctrinal 
structures and arguments, but on events. As a consequence, its objects are often 
judicial decisions as responses to real life situations, and legal systems are 
compared by considering their various judicial responses to similar situations. 
Second, functionalist comparative law combines its factual approach with the 
theory that its objects must be understood in the light of their functional relation 
to society. Law and society are thus thought to be separable but related. 
Consequently, and third, function itself serves as tertium comparationis. 
Institutions, both legal and non-legal, even doctrinally different ones, are 
comparable if they are functionally equivalent, if they fulfill similar functions in 
different legal systems. A fourth element, not shared by all variants of functional 
method, is that functionality can serve as an evaluative criterion. Functionalist 
comparative law then becomes a ‘better-law comparison’—the better of several 
laws is that which fulfills its function better than the others.”). 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. Michaels, supra note 20, at 360. 
 24. Id. at 362. 




individual institutions to narrow policy objectives. This microscopic 
focus, however, ignores a solution’s potential to have greater implications 
for the structural integrity of the legal system as a whole. 
Although functionalism is a dominant force in comparative law,25 this 
Comment challenges the broader utility of the functional approach with 
respect to the problems associated with adhesion contracts. This challenge 
is grounded on the fact that the proliferation of adhesion contracts has a 
profound impact on the general theory of contract law and, thereby, the 
legal system as a whole.26 The concern is that proposed solutions are 
inseparable from their guiding principles, which may be inconsistent with 
the general principles that transcend a legal system. Thus, the adoption of 
inconsistent solutions undermines the coherency of the legal system, 
disrupting the connection between the law and the foundation of the law’s 
legitimacy.27  
A more comprehensive approach to comparative exercises would look 
to the philosophical foundations of each legal system and, thereby, derive 
legal institutions from foundational principles. This is a “foundational 
approach” in that it looks to the source of a legal system’s legitimacy for 
solutions to legal problems. This approach presents a type of Copernican 
Revolution in comparative law; instead of asking whether a particular 
legal institution is justifiable in light of narrow policy objectives, this 
inquiry will establish whether narrow policy objectives are justifiable in 
light of the underlying foundation of existing legal institutions. This shift 
is subtle, but important. In a practical application, for example, this shift 
may involve a set of inquiries that are meant to derive practical solutions 
to adhesion contracts from the philosophical foundations of the Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. at 341. 
 26. See infra Part I.C. 
 27. In this sense, the functionalist approach is associated with three major 
disadvantages that cripple its utility as a comparative exercise. First, the functional 
approach risks losing sight of the forest for the trees. By focusing on narrow policy 
objectives and problems, it is easy to forget that a legal system is a complex web of 
institutions and that one minor change in one area of the law can send shockwaves 
of confusion and inconsistency throughout other areas. Second, without a coherent 
theory or set of broad policies to tie specific legal institutions together, the choice 
of a particular policy rationale for any given legal institution is relatively arbitrary. 
Finally, the functional approach assumes away the issue of legitimacy and fails to 
recognize that, for a government to solve problems, there must first be a legitimate 
government. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to give a detailed account of 
the functionalist approach or a complete critique of its application. This Comment 
is primarily tailored to identifying and dealing with one specific problem with the 
functionalist approach—its deficiency in determining the coherency of a particular 
legal institution with a broader legal system that is governed by general principles. 




civil law and Anglo-American common law legal systems. These inquiries 
are collectively what this Comment calls the “foundational method.” 
Recognizing the necessity of determining coherency before competency, 
the main purpose of this Comment is to present an example of how a 
comparativist may employ a “foundational approach” to comparative law. 
This Comment applies its version of the foundational approach to the 
treatment of adhesion contracts in the Anglo-American common law legal 
system as well as Louisiana’s civil law legal system. Thus, although this 
Comment’s narrow goal is to determine whether the doctrine of 
unconscionability is coherent with those legal systems, and the broader goal 
is to illustrate the foundational approach’s steps in the process. There are 
four of these steps, which guide the structure of this Comment. 
Part I of this Comment illustrates the first step in the foundational 
approach, which is to identify and articulate the nature of a “legal problem.” 
This Part argues that the proliferation of adhesion contracts results in the 
death of the bargain in consumer contracts and strips away significant 
evidentiary and theoretical justifications for the enforcement of contracts 
generally, undermining the legitimacy of contract law in both the common 
law legal system and Louisiana’s civil law legal system. Part II illustrates 
the second step in the foundational approach, which is to account for a 
proposed solution to the legal problem presented in the first step as well 
as to determine the guiding principles of that solution. This Part focuses 
on a proposed solution to the problems associated with adhesion contracts 
from the common law—the doctrine of unconscionability. Part III illustrates 
the third step in the foundational approach, which is to use the “foundational 
method” to test whether proposed solutions to legal problems are coherent 
with the legal systems under consideration. Utilizing social contract theory, 
this Part argues that two “perspectives” on the social contract—the “means-
focused” perspective and the “ends-focused” perspective—can act as 
philosophical foundations of the common law legal system and Louisiana’s 
civil law legal system, respectively. These philosophical foundations can be 
used to deduce general principles of each legal system, which can be 
compared with the guiding principles of the doctrine of unconscionability to 
determine the doctrine’s coherency with each legal system. Part IV 
illustrates the fourth step in the foundational approach, which is to conduct 
“secondary inquiries” in light of the coherency of the proposed solution. 
After determining that the doctrine of unconscionability is readily coherent 
with the common law but leaves something wanting in Louisiana’s civil law, 
this Part argues that Louisiana courts should focus more attention on the 
cause requirement of contract as a means of policing adhesion contracts. 
This Comment concludes by suggesting that—in addition to being 




“conscionable”—adhesion contracts in Louisiana must be “sociable,” 
reflecting the importance of a cause that is consistent with public policy.  
I. IDENTIFYING THE LEGAL PROBLEM: THE DEATH OF THE BARGAIN IN 
CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
Before determining whether a proposed solution to a legal problem is 
coherent with the overall legal system, one must first establish the 
existence of a “legal problem”—a development that degrades the 
structural integrity of a coherent legal system.28 Consequently, the first 
step in the foundational approach is to articulate the general nature of a 
legal problem, which must be distinguished from specific policy 
concerns.29 One example of a legal problem is the development of 
adhesion contracts.30 The development of adhesion contracts presents a 
legal problem for both the common law and Louisiana’s civil law, because 
the proliferation of adhesion contracts tends to degrade evidentiary and 
theoretical justifications for the enforcement of consumer contracts, 
undermining the legitimacy of contract law.31 Accordingly, this Part 
illustrates the first step in the foundational approach by considering the 
proliferation of adhesion contracts, which are contracts typically presented 
as a standard form. 
                                                                                                             
 28. Not all developments will present “legal problems,” because their impact 
on the legitimacy and coherency of a legal system may be negligible. For example, 
a government’s decision to develop a particular traffic management system—with 
rules concerning the speed limit, the direction of traffic, and the directing signs—
is not likely to have broader consequences for the coherency or legitimacy of the 
legal system, assuming the decision was made in accordance with proper 
procedure. This is not to say that a traffic management system does not implicate 
policy concerns but instead that the concerns are not substantially legal in nature.  
 29. Some examples of specific policy concerns include concerns related to 
economics, morality, politics, sociology, and the sciences. The problem with 
considering specific policy concerns when addressing the appropriateness of 
governmental action is that even the “most competent” solution from a given 
policy standpoint may be illegitimate from a legal standpoint. In addition, 
governmental action can only be legitimate if the government is itself legitimate. 
Thus, the question of legitimacy and coherency precedes the question of 
competence. 
 30. See infra Part I.C. 
 31. See infra Part I.C. 




A. The Proliferation of Adhesion Contracts 
The standard form contract is a natural outgrowth of the consumer 
economy, which impersonalizes the consumer–producer relationship.32 
Large corporations and industry groups craft boilerplate language33 to 
lower transactional costs,34 suppress juridical risks,35 and ensure favorable 
terms.36 Such terms are often presented to consumers embedded in a larger 
                                                                                                             
 32. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom 
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943) (“The development of large scale 
enterprise with its mass production and mass distribution made a new type of 
contract inevitable—the standardized mass contract. A standardized contract, once 
its contents have been formulated by a business firm, is used in every bargain 
dealing with the same product or service. The individuality of the parties which 
so frequently gave color to the old type contract has disappeared. The stereotyped 
contract of today reflects the impersonality of the market.” (footnote omitted)). 
 33. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 87 (N.J. 
1960) (discussing a standard warranty clause drafted by the Automobile 
Manufacturers Association). 
 34. Clayton P. Gillette, Standard Form Contracts, in 6 CONTRACT LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 115 (Gerrit de Geest ed., 2011). The standard form contract allows 
for efficient spreading of fixed drafting costs, allowing firms to achieve 
significant economies of scale. See Steven R. Salbu, Evolving Contract as a 
Device for Flexible Coordination and Control, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 329, 375–76 
(1997) (“Standardized language and culture can generate transaction efficiencies 
by facilitating the trading of contractual rights. The transaction cost savings that 
result from standardization of terms are akin to the economies of scale that are 
realized in manufacturing when an investment in fixed assets is spread across a 
large number of outputs. Like customized production processes, individually 
tailored contracting incurs high variable costs that must be renewed with each unit 
of production. These variable costs are comprised of the time and resources that 
must be invested in developing new contract terms for otherwise familiar 
transactions, and analyzing these customized terms whenever a contract is 
consulted.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 35. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 336. Juridical risks or “‘[j]uridical hazard’ is a term used 
to describe the risks to insurers arising from the resolution of uncertainties in a 
judicial process rather than some idealized mechanism.” Charles Tiefer, 
Forfeiture by Cancelation or Termination, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1031, 1065 n.178 
(2003); see also Kessler, supra note 32, at 631 (“The insurance business probably 
deserves credit also for having first realized the full importance of the so-called 
‘juridical risk’, the danger that a court or jury may be swayed by ‘irrational 
factors’ to decide against a powerful defendant.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form 
Contract?: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 677, 713 (2007) (finding most end-user license agreements 




document, formatted to small print, and written in confusing language.37 
Generally, when presented with a standard form contract, consumers have 
a clear choice: adhere to the non-negotiable terms or walk away from the 
transaction.38 To call a consumer’s decision a “choice,” however, is often 
misleading, because adherence to the contract is usually necessary for the 
consumer to attain some good or service that is indispensable to modern 
life.39 
The contracts described above are often termed “adhesion contracts,” 
reflecting the consumer’s inability to modify the contractual language.40 
Although not all standard form contracts can be classified as adhesion 
                                                                                                             
associated with typical non-customized software products display a net bias in 
favor of the software company when compared to the relevant default rules of 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 37. See Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-
Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 441, 453 (2004). 
 38. Deborah Zalesne, Enforcing the Contract at All (Social) Costs: The 
Boundary Between Private Contract Law and the Public Interest, 11 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 579, 585 (2005); see also State ex rel. King v. B&B Inv. Grp., 
Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 669 (N.M. 2014). 
 39. For example, to gain access to the Internet and all of its associated 
services (for example, e-mail, online shopping, social media, news media, etc.), 
the consumer is required to submit to the “terms and conditions” of not only the 
internet provider but also the internet browser software provider and website 
providers. See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short 
History of Sticky Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV. 129, 135 (2012). 
Another example involves so-called “shrink-wrap agreements.” As Professor 
Zalesne explains:  
Shrink-wrap licenses, which apply to store-bought software, have been 
at the center of much contract debate in recent years. Generally, 
reference to these license agreements is placed on the outside of software 
packaging, but the detailed terms are often placed inside the package, or 
they are encoded as part of the set-up of computer programs. When a 
consumer uses the product or clicks on the “accept” button referencing 
the contract agreement, the purchaser agrees to the provisions as stated, 
even though those terms were not accessible at the time of purchase.  
Zalesne, supra note 38, at 588–89 (footnote omitted); see also King, 329 P.3d at 
669. 
 40. See Saúl Litvinoff, Consent Revisited: Offer Acceptance Option Right of 
First Refusal and Contracts of Adhesion in the Revision of the Louisiana Law of 
Obligations, 47 LA. L. REV. 699, 757 (1987). 




contracts,41 that classification is generally appropriate when there is a 
significant disparity in bargaining power between the consumer and the 
drafter.42 Thus, an adhesion contract is typically equated to “a contract 
drafted unilaterally by a business enterprise and forced upon an unwilling 
and often unknowing public for services that cannot readily be obtained 
elsewhere.”43 Regardless of the precise definition, adhesion contracts are 
uniformly characterized by a lack of meaningful consumer choice.44 
Although this fact has led courts to treat adhesion contracts with hostility,45 
                                                                                                             
 41. Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 908 So. 2d 1, 10 (La. 2005) (noting 
“a contract of adhesion is a contract executed in a standard form in the vast 
majority of instances”). 
 42. Id. at 8–9 (“Broadly defined, a contract of adhesion is a standard contract, 
usually in printed form, prepared by a party of superior bargaining power for 
adherence or rejection of the weaker party.” (quoting Golz v. Children’s Bureau 
of New Orleans, 326 So. 2d 865, 869 (La. 1976)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 43. Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); see also 
Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 135 n.11 (4th Cir. 1967) 
(noting the early recognition among legal scholars of the “difference between 
contracts negotiated between coequals and standard printed form contracts offered 
the public by industries so powerful, by reason of franchise or otherwise, to 
effectively impose terms (called an ‘adhesion contract’) . . . .”); Broemmer v. 
Abortion Servs. of Phx., Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc) 
(equating adhesion contracts to “a standardized form ‘offered to consumers of 
goods and services on essentially a ‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording the 
consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that the 
consumer cannot obtain the desired product or services except by acquiescing in 
the form contract” (quoting Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 
(Ct. App. 1976))). 
 44. See Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1016 (echoing the view of adhesion contracts 
articulated in California jurisprudence, which “stated that ‘[t]he distinctive feature 
of a contract of adhesion is that the weaker party has no realistic choice as to its 
terms’” (quoting Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 783)). 
 45. For example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found that the terms in an automobile sales contract, which 
purported to give the buyer a “delusive remedy of replacement of defective parts 
at the factory” while eliminating the “maker’s liability for personal injuries arising 
from the breach of the warranty, and . . . any other express or implied warranty,” 
caused “[a]n instinctively felt sense of justice [to cry] out against such a sharp 
bargain.” 32 N.J. 358, 388 (1960). After noting that, “in the framework of modern 
commercial life and business practices,” the basic tenet of the freedom of contract 
“cannot be applied on a strict, doctrinal basis,” the court recognized the “gross 
inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile 




their use in consumer transactions has grown exponentially over the last 
150 years.46  
Today, no one questions the ubiquity of adhesion contracts,47 
especially when consumers deal with large corporations.48 From browsing 
the Internet to renting an apartment, the average consumer encounters 
boilerplate terms on a daily basis.49 The consumer, who has neither the 
patience nor the expertise to read and review the fine print, usually ignores 
these terms.50 Even if the consumer were to object to any of the terms, they 
                                                                                                             
industry.” Id. at 386, 391. Next, the court described the relationship between the 
disparity in bargaining power and the nature of the contract:  
The warranty before us is a standardized form designed for mass use. It 
is imposed upon the automobile consumer. He takes it or leaves it, and 
he must take it to buy an automobile. No bargaining is engaged in with 
respect to it. In fact, the dealer through whom it comes to the buyer is 
without authority to alter it; his function is ministerial—simply to deliver 
it. The form warranty is not only standard with Chrysler but, as 
mentioned above, it is the uniform warranty of the Automobile 
Manufacturers Association. 
Id. at 391. The court concluded that the boilerplate disclaimer of warranty was 
void as a matter of law. Id. at 405. 
 46. See generally Preston & McCann, supra note 39 (discussing the history 
of adhesion contracts and common law responses to problems associated with 
such contracts). 
 47. Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal 
Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 469, 479 (2006); see also W. David Slawson, Standard Form 
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 
529 (1971). 
 48. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1225 (1983). 
 49. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 7–8 (2013). 
 50. One study placed “the fraction of retail software shoppers that accesses 
[end-user license agreements] at between 0.05% and 0.22%” and found that “the 
very few shoppers that do access it do not, on average, spend enough time on it to 
have digested more than a fraction of its content.” Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer 
Attention to Standard Form Contracts 35 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., 
Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256 
[https://perma.cc/VT6V-W6DK] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (concluding “very few 
consumers choose to become informed about standard form online contracts”). In 
fact, this result seems to be the very purpose of drafting a standard form contract. 
See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New 




are typically presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.51 Thus, the idea that 
there is any meaningful “meeting of the minds” on non-dickered terms is 
largely a legal fiction.52  
The acceptance of this legal fiction is alarming when one considers the 
importance of non-dickered terms, which frequently include provisions that 
negate significant consumer rights: arbitration clauses, choice of law 
clauses, forum selection clauses, disclaimers of warranties, exclusion of 
liability for damages, remedy limitations, indemnification clauses, and 
clauses reserving the right to make unilateral changes to contract terms.53 
As this list makes clear, non-dickered terms in adhesion contracts often 
determine both a consumer’s substantive rights under the contract and—
perhaps more troubling—that consumer’s ability to enforce his or her 
substantive rights under the contract.54 
B. The Primary Concern with Legal Developments 
Due to the significance of boilerplate terms in adhesion contracts, 
policy concerns have been at the forefront of the debate over the 
enforceability of such terms. However, there is a glaring problem in the 
literature, which is dominated by functionalist analysis. Even if one’s 
                                                                                                             
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 504 (1967) (“The form contract is designed not 
to be read or pondered; if it is or has to be it loses much of its utility.”).  
 51. As Professor Rakoff explains, this fact is widely understood by 
consumers:  
Customers know well enough that they cannot alter any individual firm’s 
standard document. They are largely members of the society that spawns 
business firms, and they understand the institutional arrangements behind 
the take-it-or-leave-it stance. If they do not, and if they attempt to bargain 
the form terms, the salesman will explain his lack of authority to vary the 
form. Haggling, the customer finds, requires penetrating the hierarchical 
structure of the firm in the hope of finding someone who will deal—a 
daunting and perhaps prohibitively costly endeavor. And there may in fact 
be no one at any level who is willing to bargain. “We cannot make an 
exception for one customer”—the language of standardization becomes a 
moral claim. Ultimately, in transactions involving organizational 
hierarchies, bargaining ceases to be the expected, or even appropriate, 
consumer behavior. 
Rakoff, supra note 48, at 1225. 
 52. See Zalesne, supra note 38, at 586. 
 53. Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using 
“Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in 
Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 516 (2008). 
 54. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011). 




position in the debate can be objectively determined by invoking policy 
considerations, there is no clear answer to the preliminary question: which 
policy consideration should be paramount?55  
A multitude of options are available for determining which policy 
consideration should be paramount,56 including economic efficiency, 
contractual freedom, fairness, and political pragmatism.57 But these 
concerns are premature and superficial; policy concerns are neither 
justifiable in themselves nor susceptible to objective balancing. Instead, 
when analyzing the legitimacy of a particular class of contract, the 
question of legal soundness should always be the primary concern, 
because contracts are not made in a legal vacuum and must pass the 
enforceability hurdle to be relevant.  
Contracts are useful as a legal institution only because they carry the 
force of law and give effect to agreements. Thus, before deciding whether 
the enforcement of a particular type of agreement is good policy, one has 
to ask whether its enforcement is coherent with the legal system that 
provides for the enforcement. One way to begin this inquiry into the legal 
problem of adhesion contracts is by asking the fundamental question of 
contract law: which agreements—or more precisely which promises—
should be enforceable as a matter of law?58 
C. The Legal Problem of Adhesion Contracts 
As one scholar notes, “[n]o legal system has ever been reckless enough 
to make all promises enforceable.”59 Although a promise may bring about 
                                                                                                             
 55. It is premature to evaluate adhesion contracts’ impact on particular policy 
concerns when those concerns have not even been shown to be relevant or 
important.  
 56. For every identifiable public policy concern there are many potential 
perspectives and solutions, creating a disjointed debate.  
 57. See, e.g., James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
161 (2013); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate: Confronting 
Normative and Democratic Degradation, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 617 (2012). 
 58. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 1 (8th ed. 2013). 
 59. Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion 
and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 139 (2005). Consistent with this view, 
while broadly defining a promise as “a manifestation of intention to act or refrain 
from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding 
that a commitment has been made,” the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
narrowly defines a contract as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of 
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way 
recognizes as a duty.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1–2 (1981). 




moral duties a priori,60 it does not necessarily follow that the law should 
enforce all promises or allow all promises to be carried out, as the result 
may be inconsistent with the recognized interests of the promisor, the 
promisee, third persons, or society as a whole.61 Thus, the law ultimately 
determines the limits of a binding promise.62 These limits reflect broader 
normative principles that underlie a society’s values and views concerning 
the legitimacy of legal authority.63 When new developments in the law are 
contrary to such principles, the structural integrity of the legal system is 
threatened. As a result, it is important to screen new developments for 
legal problems that threaten the coherency of the legal system by allowing 
for the proliferation of incoherent legal institutions. For example, adhesion 
contracts present such legal problems for both the common law and civil 
law, because their proliferation undermines the values that support the 
enforcement of contracts generally.64 
                                                                                                             
 60. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS 36–40 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., Dover 2005) (1785). For Kant, the act of 
promise-keeping exemplifies the first formulation of his Categorical Imperative: “Act 
only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.” See generally Matt McCormick, Immanuel Kant: 
Metaphysics, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantmeta 
/#H8 [https://perma.cc/6WKX-Z9KM] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 61. This Comment is interested in the legitimacy of governmental action, 
which includes the enforcement of contracts. To say that the legitimacy of 
governmental action is purely a moral inquiry is to ignore the practical difficulties 
associated with various perspectives. Often, the law must make a difficult choice 
between competing interests, which—in isolation—may all be seen as legitimate. 
 62. This principle is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
which suggests an antithetical correlative to promises that are enforceable as a 
matter of law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (“A contract is a 
promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
 63. See infra Part III. 
 64. The major concern here is not mere “fairness” as a narrow policy goal but 
instead coherency as a prerequisite for legitimate governmental action. In other 
words, the concern is not functional but instead foundational. This distinction 
highlights the novelty of this Comment’s approach in comparison to the approach 
of other scholars, who may arrive at a similar conclusion—that adhesion contracts 
present problems for contract law—by way of functional means, such as looking 
to the empirical effect of legal developments on narrow policy goals to tailor 
responses that further those goals. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 47, at 565–66 
(“If contract law is to provide the basis for a democratic system of private law and 
for a competitive economy which works in the interests of consumers—indeed, if 
it is to meet the minimal requirements of rationality—it must take into account 
the two pervasive conditions under which modern contracting takes place. . . . 




1. The Role of the Bargain 
When considering contracts generally, an important value for both the 
civil law and the common law is the promotion of “liberty” interests.65 
Although amorphous, this value is best represented in a general contract 
law requirement—“mutuality of assent.” By requiring that both parties 
agree to the terms of the contract, the law protects the individual’s liberty 
to make autonomous decisions as to the assumption of rights and 
obligations. Without this requirement, the enforcement of particular terms 
would at best be arbitrary, undermining basic individual liberty. 
This observation does not suggest that contract law must require a 
subjective “meeting of the minds.”66 Instead, contracts may be enforced in 
light of the “objective manifestation of mutual assent.”67 The legitimacy 
of the enforcement, however, is necessarily tied to the reliability of the 
objective manifestation of consent, which is simply a proxy for actual 
consent.68 In this context, one can see the importance of the bargain.  
                                                                                                             
There being no private consent to support a contract of adhesion, its legitimacy 
rests entirely on its compliance with standards in the public interest. The 
individual who is subject to the obligations imposed by a standard form thus gains 
the assurance that the rules to which he is subject have received his consent either 
directly or through their conforming to higher public laws and standards made and 
enforced by the public institutions that legitimately govern him.”). 
 65. See Nicholas S. Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 
14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 172, 172–73 (1965). 
 66. It is important to note that such a requirement is not indefensible. Ricketts 
v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 760–61 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (“The element of 
agreement is sometimes referred to as a ‘meeting of the minds.’ The parties to 
most contracts give actual as well as apparent assent, but it is clear that a mental 
reservation of a party to a bargain does not impair the obligation he purports to 
undertake.”). 
 68. Judge Frank articulated the paradox that arises when one completely 
disregards the subjective consent of the parties in favor of the objective 
manifestation of their consent—actual liberty is sacrificed for apparent liberty:  
The “actual intent” theory, said the objectivists, being “subjective” and 
putting too much stress on unique individual motivations, would destroy 
that legal certainty and stability which a modern commercial society 
demands. They depicted the “objective” standard as a necessary adjunct 
of a “free enterprise” economic system. In passing, it should be noted 
that they arrived at a sort of paradox. For a “free enterprise” system is, 
theoretically, founded on “individualism”; but, in the name of economic 
individualism, the objectivists refused to consider those reactions of 
actual specific individuals which sponsors of the “meeting-of-the-
minds” test purported to cherish. “Economic individualism” thus shows 




The bargain provides clear evidence that the parties were able to freely 
and knowingly assent to the contract’s terms, preserving the reliability of 
the manifestation of mutual assent.69 The offer and the acceptance can be 
compared for equivalency and tested for vices of consent, such as fraud, 
duress, and error.70 If the offer mirrors the acceptance and the bargain is 
objectively vice-free, the law may safely presume that, in fact, the parties 
actually consented. On the rare occasion that the objective manifestation 
of assent as evidenced by the bargain does not reflect the subjective intent 
of the parties, the law can write off the technical insufficiency of a minority 
of cases as a necessary cost of maintaining the integrity of the legal 
institution of contract.  
The utility of the bargain breaks down when the “acceptance” merely 
acknowledges the existence of additional terms while manifesting—at 
most—nominal consent to such terms. This problem has been recognized 
in the general commercial context concerning the “battle of the forms.”71 
In the typical case, merchants exchange forms with conflicting boilerplate 
language that would not constitute a binding contract under the traditional 
mirror image rule but nevertheless act in accordance with the dickered terms 
of the agreement.72 There is a breakdown in the bargain, because many 
terms remain in conflict even after the agreement has been substantially 
carried out.73 To cope with the death of the bargain in this context, most 
jurisdictions have adopted an elaborate statutory scheme.74 But because 
consumers do not have their own boilerplates to apply to commercial 
transactions, a consumer’s “acknowledgment” takes on a different 
character, and the statutory scheme that protects merchants is inapplicable 
                                                                                                             
up as hostile to real individualism. This is nothing new: The “economic 
man” is of course an abstraction, a “fiction.” 
Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761 n.2 (Frank, J., concurring). 
 69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c. 
 70. Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 
443 (1995); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 72 cmt. c, 75 
cmt. a. 
 71. See generally FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 58, at 202–04 (discussing 
the nature of and the general problems presented by the “battle of the forms”). 
 72. See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 
1972) (discussing the application of § 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code to 
the question of whether an arbitration clauses appearing on the back of the 
defendant-seller’s acknowledgment forms were enforceable against the plaintiff-
buyer, who accepted delivery of the object of sale). 
 73. See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 58, at 203. 
 74. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1962). 




to consumer commercial transactions.75 Thus, in consumer contracts, the 
fact that “the adhering party generally enters into [adhesion contracts] 
without manifesting knowing and voluntary consent to all their terms” 
presents a significant problem for the traditional role of the bargain that 
still requires significant attention.76  
2. The Death of the Bargain in Consumer Contracts 
As courts quickly recognized, the proliferation of adhesion contracts 
meant the end of the bargain in consumer contracts.77 Even in the best light, 
a consumer’s acceptance of the boilerplate terms of adhesion contracts is 
more of blind trust or willful ignorance than a sign of knowing and free 
consent.78 Although there may be an identifiable “offer” and “acceptance,” 
the primary function of the bargain is muted, because adhesion contracts do 
“not resemble the Platonic ideal of a list of jointly negotiated terms.”79 Thus, 
while the shell of the bargain remains, its spirit is dead.  
                                                                                                             
 75. U.C.C. section 2-207 is only applicable when additional or different terms 
are in the acceptance or confirmation, which typically take the form of boilerplate 
provisions in a merchant’s “Acknowledgement Form.” See FARNSWORTH ET AL., 
supra note 58, at 203–05. 
 76. Andrew Tutt, Note, On the Invalidation of Terms in Contracts of 
Adhesion, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 439, 442 (2013). 
 77. See, e.g., Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (“An 
adhesion contract is generally not bargained for, but is imposed on the public for 
a necessary service on a take or leave it basis.”); Kostelac v. United States, 247 
F.2d 723, 728 n.7 (9th Cir. 1957) (equating adhesion contracts to “contracts in 
which one party in the stronger bargaining position provides the form of the 
contract which may contain many terms which are not in any sense bargained for 
between the parties, but are imposed upon the weaker by the dominant party”). 
 78. As courts have noted, “[t]he distinctive feature of a contract of adhesion 
is that the weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms.” Broemmer v. 
Abortion Servs. of Phx., Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc) 
(quoting Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Ct. App. 1976)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Even if there were some indicia of a 
meaningful choice to enter into specific terms, the complexity of the language and 
the legal concepts makes these terms unintelligible to most lay consumers. See 
Rakoff, supra note 48, at 1226. 
 79. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003). In fact, courts have 
acknowledged that a meaningful bargain is so unlikely that it would be 
unreasonable to assume consumers would even attempt to negotiate the content 
of boilerplate terms. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 
593 (1991) (noting that “[i]t would be entirely unreasonable for [the Court] to 
assume that respondents [cruise passengers]—or any other cruise passenger—




The death of the bargain in consumer contracts is problematic from a 
foundational perspective because it exposes weaknesses in the theoretical 
basis for the enforcement of contracts generally. This idea stems from two 
sources. 
First, consumers generally do not subjectively consent to all the terms 
in adhesion contracts as a matter of fact. When one recognizes that the 
majority of consumer contracts can be considered adhesion contracts80 and 
the consumers almost never understand the boilerplate terms of such 
contracts,81 the only logical conclusion is that the majority of consumer 
contracts include terms that are not truly consented to.82 Two 
counterarguments to this point can be easily disposed of. For one, it may 
be argued that consumers can give blanket consent without knowledge of 
the content of the term,83 but that argument renders consent meaningless. 
In addition, it may be argued that consumers have a duty to read and 
understand the terms,84 but contract law—as an intellectually distinct legal 
institution—should focus on what parties actually do, not what they should 
do (negligence is in the realm of tort law). These two counterarguments 
are even more out of place when considering the treatment of the battle of 
the forms: If merchants are not expected to analyze boilerplates terms, why 
should the lay consumer be expected to? 
                                                                                                             
would negotiate with [the cruise line] the terms of a forum-selection clause in an 
ordinary commercial cruise ticket”). Many recognize that consumers rarely even 
try to understand the obscure terms and, of those who do try, virtually none 
succeed. See, e.g., Bakos et al., supra note 50, at 35. 
 80. This conclusion depends on two widely recognized facts. First, “[standard] 
form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the 
contracts now made.” Slawson, supra note 47, at 529. Second, the majority of 
standard form consumer contracts are adhesionary, at least in the sense that they are 
“prepared by a party of superior bargaining power for adherence or rejection of 
the weaker party.” Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 908 So. 2d 1, 9 (La. 2005) 
(quoting Golz v. Children’s Bureau of New Orleans, 326 So. 2d 865, 869 (La. 
1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. See Rakoff, supra note 48, at 1225. 
 82. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (“[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, 
signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its 
terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his 
consent, was ever given to all the terms.”). 
 83. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 360 (1960); see also Warkentine, supra note 53, at 488–90. 
 84. See, e.g., John D. Calamari, Duty to Read: A Changing Concept, 43 
FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974). 




Second, consumers do not have a meaningful choice to enter into 
specific boilerplate terms. There are two reasons for this fact. For one, 
boilerplate terms are often practically identical across producers in the same 
industry.85 For example, a person who wants to buy a cell phone may choose 
a provider, but, if all providers have the same standard form contract, it 
cannot be said that a consumer could choose to avoid the terms of the 
contract. In this case, uniformity replaces the traditional monopoly.86 In 
addition, adhesion contracts go hand-in-glove with goods and services that 
are indispensible in modern life. Following the above example, the 
meaningfulness of the consumer’s choice is further degraded by the fact that 
having a cell phone is indispensable in the twenty-first century.87 
3. The Significance of the Legal Problem 
The combination of these two results—the absence of a consumer’s 
actual consent to all the terms in the contract and the lack of a meaningful 
choice to enter into a particular boilerplate term—degrades the theoretical 
basis for enforcing contracts, regardless of the objective manifestation of 
assent. Although a few isolated instances of theoretical deficiency may not 
raise much concern, the proliferation of adhesion contracts has the 
potential to distort the scope of contract law. Such a large-scale 
promulgation of legal fictions degrades the legitimacy of contract law 
generally by advancing the merits of form over substance. This 
development is not only problematic in the functional sense, but also goes 
to the heart of contract law in the civil law and common law legal systems, 
                                                                                                             
 85. Radin, supra note 57, at 635–36. Standard-setting organizations may 
create concerns of monopolist collusion. See Erica S. Mintzer & Logan M. Breed, 
How to Keep the Fox Out of the Henhouse: Monopolization in the Context of 
Standard-Setting Organizations, 19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2007). 
However, this phenomenon does not necessarily require actual collusion. See 
David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form 
Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of 
Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 1005–08 (2006) 
(discussing the boilerplate provisions could be used to facilitate tacit collusion 
among competitors).  
 86. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of Standard Form Contracts: The 
Monopoly Case, 24 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 119, 120 (2007). 
 87. According to a 2013 study, of American adults 91% owned a cell phone, 
81% sent and received text messages, and 60% accessed the Internet. MAEVE 
DUGGAN, CELL PHONE ACTIVITIES 2013, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://bibliobase.sermais.pt:8008/BiblioNET/Upload/PDF5/003819.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/47R8-3EEN]. 




which respectively regard the existence of contractual consent as an 
essential feature of a binding contract.88  
                                                                                                             
 88. Keeping with the civil law tradition, Louisiana law defines a contract as 
“an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, 
or extinguished.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2016). Because a contract results from 
multiple juridical acts, it is no wonder that consent is an explicit element of a 
contract. Id. art. 1927; ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 
IN GENERAL: A PRÉCIS 4 (3d ed. 2009). In fact, “[a] contract is formed by the 
consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance.” LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 1927 (emphasis added). There is no contract until the parties assent to all the 
terms. See id. art. 1943 (“An acceptance not in accordance with the terms of the 
offer is deemed to be a counteroffer.”). Adhesion contracts present a problem 
because the manner in which they are executed may suggest “a defect of consent, 
that is, the absence of a free and deliberate exercise of the will.” Ronald L. 
Hersbergen, Unconscionability: The Approach of the Louisiana Civil Code, 43 
LA. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (1983).  
Like the civil law, the common law likens a contract to an agreement, 
whereby a party’s intent to be legally bound by a promise is of primary concern. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981). The objective theory of 
contract dominates, however, and the subjective intent of the parties is less of an 
issue for the common law courts. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 
200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (“A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to 
do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation 
attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, 
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were 
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended 
something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he 
would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else of 
the sort. Of course, if it appear by other words, or acts, of the parties, that they 
attribute a peculiar meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that 
meaning will prevail, but only by virtue of the other words, and not because of 
their unexpressed intent.”); Nycal Corp. v. Inoco PLC, 988 F. Supp. 296, 302 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[W]hen resolving disputes concerning the meaning of 
ambiguous contract language, unexpressed subjective views have no proper 
bearing. Only the parties’ objective manifestations of intent are considered.”). The 
problem with adhesion contracts for the common law is that they corrode the basis 
for an objective manifestation of mutual assent—the bargain. See Siegelman v. 
Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting) 
(“The ticket is what has been called a ‘contract of adhesion’ or a ‘take-it-or-leave-
it’ contract. In such a standardized or mass-production agreement, with one-sided 
control of its terms, when the one party has no real bargaining power, the usual 
contract rules, based on the idea of ‘freedom of contract,’ cannot be applied 
rationally. For such a contract is ‘sold not bought.’ The one party dictates its 
provisions; the other has no more choice in fixing those terms than he has about 
the weather. The insurance policy cases are outstanding examples, but there are 




In short, with the loss of the bargain comes the loss of significant 
evidentiary and theoretical justifications for the enforcement of contracts 
generally. As for evidentiary justifications, the bargain, which disappears 
in the context of adhesion contracts, provides clear evidence of actual 
assent. Without the bargain, other forms of the objective manifestation of 
mutual assent are inherently less reliable. For example, the mere fact that 
there is a writing littered with boilerplate terms and a consumer signature 
somewhere on the page does not provide convincing evidence that the 
consumer actually agreed to the terms of the boilerplate. This fact is only 
aggravated by the widespread acknowledgment that most consumers do 
not even bother to read the terms.89 In such cases, reliance on the 
evidentiary value of a written contract is absurd. Thus, the loss of the 
bargain leaves an evidentiary gap in contract law that cannot be patched 
with a legal fiction. As for theoretical justifications, the problem runs 
deeper. If the legal system enforces “agreements” that everyone knows 
were not—as a matter of fact—agreed to, questions of legitimacy arise and 
the integrity of the entire legal system is threatened.  
Thus, coherency problems associated with adhesion contracts in the 
civil law and common law can be condensed into one legal problem: the 
proliferation of adhesion contracts and the resulting death of the bargain 
strips away theoretical and evidentiary justifications for the enforcement 
of consumer contracts and, thereby, undermines the legitimacy of the 
enforcement of contracts generally. To properly solve this legal problem, 
one must identify coherent solutions. 
                                                                                                             
many others. Our courts, in particular contexts, have, in effect, nullified many 
provisions of such agreements, if unfair to the weaker party who must take-or-
leave.” (footnote omitted)). 
 89. Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective 
Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1993). 
Some scholars recognize that it is actually economically inefficient for consumers 
to read long, complex consumer contracts. Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient 
Form Contract: Law and Economics Meet the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 
600 (1990) (finding that “the benefit to be derived from acquiring adequate 
knowledge of contract terms is usually low and is likely to be far exceeded by the 
significant costs of acquiring that information. It is, therefore, rational for even a 
conscientious consumer to pay little, if any, attention to subordinate contract 
terms.”). 




II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE LEGAL PROBLEM: THE DOCTRINE OF 
UNCONSCIONABILITY 
Once a legal problem has been established, one may search for 
coherent solutions, which take the form of legal institutions. For this 
reason, the second step in the foundational approach is to account for a 
proposed solution to the legal problem identified in the first step. 
Regardless of its origin, the proposed solution’s coherency must ultimately 
be tested. Consequently, the proposed solution is treated as a hypothesis 
and is evaluated to distill its guiding principles, which will eventually be 
compared to the general principles of the legal system. To address the legal 
problem associated with the proliferation of adhesion contracts, this Part 
will examine a proposed solution from the common law—the doctrine of 
unconscionability.90  
A. The Doctrine of Unconscionability in the Common Law 
American courts have long recognized the characteristic features of 
adhesion contracts91 as well as the general contract defense of 
unconscionability,92 which has English roots that can be traced as far back 
as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.93 American courts, however, 
were generally hesitant to apply the doctrine of unconscionability to 
adhesion contracts, fearing that the invalidation of such widely used 
practices would result in commercial instability.94 So, courts historically 
                                                                                                             
 90. See generally Preston & McCann, supra note 39 (discussing the history 
of adhesion contracts and common law responses to problems associated with 
such contracts). 
 91. See, e.g., Fish v. Chapman & Ross, 2 Ga. (Kelly) 349, 361–62 (1847). 
However, the term “contract of adhesion” was not introduced to the American 
common law until 1919. Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance 
Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 & n.106 (1919). 
 92. See, e.g., Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 414 (1889) (“[T]here may 
be contracts so extortionate and unconscionable on their face as to raise the 
presumption of fraud in their inception, or at least to require but slight additional 
evidence to justify such presumption. In such cases the natural and irresistible 
inference of fraud is as efficacious to maintain the defense at law as to sustain an 
application for affirmative relief in equity. When this is so, if performance has 
been accepted in ignorance and under circumstances excusing the nonreturn of 
articles furnished, and these have some value, the amount sued for may be reduced 
to that value.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Batty v. Lloyd, 23 Eng. Rep. 375 (1682); Earl of Chesterfield v. 
Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (1750). 
 94. Warkentine, supra note 53, at 472. 




used other means to police adhesion contracts that sidestepped a direct 
determination of their conscionability.95 
1. The Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-302 
This judicial “sidestepping” was addressed in the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”).96 The drafters of the UCC were concerned 
with courts policing “unconscionable” contracts “by adverse construction 
of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by 
determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the 
dominant purpose of the contract.”97 This concern prompted the drafting 
of section 2-302, which was “intended to allow the court to pass directly 
on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to 
make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability”98 by giving the court 
explicit authority to refuse to enforce the entire contract or a particular 
clause upon finding unconscionably at the time it was made.99 Addressing 
the concerns of scholars, this development was expected to promote 
certainty and clarity by ending courts’ use of judicial acrobatics “to protect 
the weaker contracting party and still keep ‘the elementary rules’ of the 
law of contracts intact.”100 
Common law jurisdictions readily adopted the language of UCC 
section 2-302.101 Courts, however, have applied the doctrine 
                                                                                                             
 95. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1962); Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 
23, 51 (Mich. 2005) (Kelly, J., dissenting).  
 96. See generally J.H.A., Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1961) (discussing the 
historical development of section 2-302 of the UCC). 
 97. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
 98. Id. 
 99. U.C.C. § 2-302(1). The court has significant discretion under the rule and, 
in lieu of complete refusal to enforce a contract or particular clause, “may so limit 
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result.” Id.  
 100. Kessler, supra note 32, at 633. 
 101. By the 1980s, the only states that had not adopted section 2-302 were 
Louisiana and California. Hersbergen, supra note 88, at 1315. The text of UCC 
section 2-302 has remained unchanged since its adoption: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of 
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 




inconsistently.102 As one scholar noted, “[t]he primary problem with this 
all-purpose weapon is that the concept of unconscionability is vague, so 
that neither courts, practicing attorneys, nor contract draftsmen can be 
certain of its applicability in any particular situation.”103  
2. The Application of the Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Although the original comments to section 2-302 suggested a basic 
test for unconscionability,104 it would be up to courts and scholars to clarify 
the broad directives of preventing “oppression and unfair surprise” without 
disturbing the “allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.”105 
Professor Arthur Leff clarified the analysis by introducing a categorization 
of contractual “defenses” based on either “bargaining naughtiness” or the 
“evils in the resulting contract.”106 Using this dichotomy, Professor Leff 
advocated for a distinction between “procedural unconscionability” and 
“substantive unconscionability,”107 which was later utilized and developed 
by common law courts.108 
Procedural unconscionability—or “bargaining naughtiness”—is 
directly concerned with the means of contractual assent. Courts focus on 
                                                                                                             
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, 
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination. 
U.C.C. § 2-302. Louisiana still has not adopted section 2-302 as of January 1, 
2016. 
 102. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 
U. PA. L. REV. 931, 931 (1969). 
 103. Id.  
 104. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (“This section is intended to allow the court to pass 
directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and 
to make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability. The basic test is whether, 
in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of 
the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be 
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the 
contract.”). 
 105. See id.; Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in 
Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1, 8 (2012).  
 106. Leff, supra note 50, at 487. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See generally Lonegrass, supra note 105, at 8–11 (tracing the 
jurisprudential development of the various approaches to the application of the 
doctrine of unconscionability).  




the actions and characteristics of the parties to determine whether there was 
“oppression,” “unfair surprise,” or some other “specific and objective indicia 
demonstrating that a consumer was unable to read and understand the terms 
of the agreement.”109 In contrast, substantive unconscionability—or the “evils 
in the resulting contract”—is indirectly concerned with the means of 
contractual assent. Instead of focusing directly on the actual bargain, a court 
will look for an inferred deficiency by asking whether a term is “such as no 
man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as 
no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”110 Thus, both procedural 
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability are concerned with 
contracts that are so unreasonable that the mere standard form does not 
provide for a reliable objective manifestation of mutual assent. Courts 
generally either require a substantial showing of both of these forms of 
unconscionability or use a “sliding-scale” approach that incorporates 
aspects of each of these to a greater or lesser degree.111  
3. The Guiding Principles of the Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Regardless of the exact approach, the principal focus of the 
unconscionability analysis is on the means of contractual assent, rather 
than the ends of contractual assent. In other words, the doctrine of 
unconscionability is concerned with objectively how—not subjectively 
why—the consumer came to assume obligations under the standard form 
contract.  
The guiding principle of the doctrine of unconscionability is the 
promotion of free choice in contractual formation. Although the standard 
form contract provides for an objective manifestation of mutual assent, the 
doctrine of unconscionability recognizes this objective manifestation may 
not provide the same evidentiary value as in other contexts. Once there is 
an objective manifestation of mutual assent, a closer look at the means of 
that assent is meant to ensure a valid procedure, providing the autonomous 
individual with the tools to advocate for his or her interests and make a free 
choice to assume obligations. In short, the common law uses the doctrine of 
unconscionability to ensure procedural safeguards in the bargaining process 
that preserve the reliability of the objective manifestation of mutual assent 
in the standard form context. 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. at 9. 
 110. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750); see also 
Lonegrass, supra note 105, at 9 (noting this formulation has been unchanged for 
250 years). 
 111. Lonegrass, supra note 105, at 25. 




In light of this purpose, a question naturally arises concerning the 
applicability of the doctrine of unconscionability in Louisiana’s civil law 
system: should this approach be adopted in Louisiana?112  
                                                                                                             
 112. When weighing proposed solutions, this Comment recognizes that it may 
be useful to cast a wide net, encompassing various jurisdictions and perspectives. 
Thus, it is important to note at the outset that other civil law jurisdictions have 
adopted comprehensive statutory schemes that deal directly with the problems 
presented by adhesion contracts, especially in the consumer context. See generally 
Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protections of 
Consumers in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised UCC 
Article 2?, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 223 (2006) (surveying global developments in 
consumer protection initiatives, especially concerning transactions involving the 
sale of goods). However, this Comment does not address such statutory schemes 
for three reasons. First, to do so would not efficiently further the primary goal of 
the Comment, which is to illustrate the practical application of the foundational 
approach. Second, such statutory schemes are unlikely to be adopted with haste 
in Louisiana (if adopted at all). Finally, such statutory schemes are not the only 
potential source of consumer protection. 
Although it may be ideal to have an explicit statutory scheme to directly 
address adhesion contracts, such a scheme is not necessarily required in 
Louisiana’s civil law system, because legislation is neither the fountain of all 
judicial action nor a straight-jacket for courts. See Olivier Moréteau, Codes as 
Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis: The Experience of the French Civil 
Code, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 273 (1995); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1, 4 
(2016). In the civil law, the court’s role is to consider specific facts and logically 
apply to those facts general principles of the common good, whether those 
principles are explicitly identified by the legislature (legislation), implicitly 
supported by the people (custom), or a matter of pure reason (equity). As 
explained by Portalis, the civil law distinguishes between legislator and judge: 
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and the former 
does not resemble the latter. The legislator’s science consists in finding 
in each subject the principles most favorable to the common good; the 
judge’s science is to put these principles into effect, to diversify them, 
and to extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application, to 
private causes; to examine closely the spirit of the law when the letter 
kills; and not to expose himself to the risk of being alternately slave and 
rebel, and of disobeying because of a servile mentality. 
Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 772 
(1969) (translation by M. Shael Herman). Thus, there is no reason to assume a 
Louisiana judge must wait for explicit statutory authorization to police adhesion 
contracts. In fact, some scholars have recommended that judges intervene to police 
adhesion contracts, but there is disagreement about whether such an intervention 
requires the adoption of the common law doctrine of unconscionability or merely 
requires judges to utilize traditional civil law contract principles. 




B. The Unconscionability Debate in Louisiana’s Civil Law System  
Louisiana has not explicitly adopted the doctrine of unconscionability. 
The Louisiana approach to adhesion contracts—adopted by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in Aguillard v. Auction Management Co.—focuses 
exclusively on the element of consent, looking to see if consent was 
vitiated by any of the traditional vices of consent.113 In Aguillard, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court did not look to common law jurisdictions for 
guidance and only mentioned unconscionability when referring to the 
plaintiff’s argument.114 This is not to say that there are not similarities in 
the Louisiana and common law approaches. For example, the Louisiana 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal distilled the Aguillard analysis of arbitration 
clauses into four factors: “(1) the physical characteristics of the arbitration 
clause, (2) the distinguishing features of the arbitration clause, (3) the 
mutuality of the arbitration clause, in terms of the relative burdens and 
advantages conferred by the clause upon each party, and (4) the relative 
bargaining strength of the parties.”115 Although these factors may relate to 
procedural and substantive unconscionability, their connection with the 
common law doctrine seems only coincidental from the supreme court’s 
opinion, which is further evidenced by the lower courts’ application of the 
Aguillard analysis.116 Thus, the extent of Louisiana’s actual acceptance of 
the doctrine remains unclear. 
Scholars have debated whether Louisiana should actually accept the 
doctrine of unconscionability. On the one hand, some civil law scholars 
have argued that a civilian judge armed with the Louisiana Civil Code is 
well equipped to deal with adhesion contracts, and thus the adoption of the 
                                                                                                             
 113. Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 908 So. 2d 1, 10–11 (La. 2005) (“In 
summation, a contract is one of adhesion when either its form, print, or unequal 
terms call into question the consent of the non-drafting party and it is demonstrated 
that the contract is unenforceable, due to lack of consent or error, which vitiates 
consent. Accordingly, even if a contract is standard in form and printed in small 
font, if it does not call into question the non-drafting party’s consent and if it is not 
demonstrated that the non-drafting party did not consent or his consent is vitiated 
by error, the contract is not a contract of adhesion.”). One odd feature of the 
opinion is that the Louisiana Supreme Court seems to equate “adhesion contracts” 
with what other jurisdictions would call “unconscionable contracts.” 
 114. Id. at 14 (“In response, the plaintiffs argued the arbitration clause was 
adhesionary and unconscionable due to defendant’s superior bargaining 
position.” (emphasis added)). 
 115. Sutton Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 971 So. 2d 1257, 
1266 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 116. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Monsanto AG Prods., 124 So. 3d 535 (La. Ct. App. 
2013). 




unconscionability doctrine is unnecessary.117 According to this view, 
unconscionability can be seen simply as “a defect of consent, that is, the 
absence of a free and deliberate exercise of the will.”118 The Louisiana 
Civil Code can deal with such a problem in a number of ways. For 
example, an “adhesion contract” may be considered non-contractual in 
nature if it is not bilateral or reciprocal,119 such as the boilerplate language 
in a receipt that is not brought to the customer’s attention.120 In addition, 
consent may be vitiated by the traditional vices of consent, especially error 
or fraud.121 The Louisiana Civil Code can also address problems of consent 
indirectly by using methods of interpretation to construe a contract in the 
consumer’s favor, withholding performance in commutative contracts, 
and invoking imperative rules, such as rescission for lesion beyond 
moiety.122 
On the other hand, it has also been argued that the doctrine of 
unconscionability has a place in Louisiana’s civil law system.123 After a 
party has objectively manifested consent to clear and unambiguous terms, 
the requirement of consent is established unless that party can show 
consent is vitiated.124 Despite the potential capability of the vices of 
consent to prevent contractual unfairness, “these concepts do have their 
origins in antiquated legal systems that never contemplated dealing with 
                                                                                                             
 117. See, e.g., Hersbergen, supra note 88.  
 118. Id. at 1318. 
 119. Id. at 1320. 
 120. Bowers v. Fox-Stanley Photo Prods., Inc., 379 So. 2d. 844 (La. Ct. App. 1980). 
 121. See generally Hersbergen, supra note 88. 
 122. See generally id. First, ambiguous terms in a contract are interpreted 
against the drafter, who is not the consumer in the standard form context. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2056 (2016). Second, concerning commutative contracts, “[e]ither party 
to a commutative contract may refuse to perform his obligation if the other has 
failed to perform or does not offer to perform his own at the same time, if the 
performances are due simultaneously.” Id. art. 2022. Finally, the Civil Code 
provides for imperative rules, such as rescission of a sale for lesion beyond 
moiety, that cannot be altered by private acts. See, e.g., id. art. 2589. 
 123. See R. Fritz Niswanger, Comment, An Unconscionability Formula for 
Louisiana Civilians?, 81 TUL. L. REV. 509 (2006). 
 124. See Litvinoff, supra note 40, at 758 (“Nevertheless, whether the contract 
is one of adhesion or one merely contained in a standard form, the enforceability 
of certain clauses, usually of the small print variety, may be questionable because 
the party now placed in a disadvantageous position by that clause was not aware 
that he was subscribing to it when he entered the contract. The question, thus, is 
whether the party gave his consent to the clause in dispute or, when it is clear that 
it was given, whether that consent was vitiated by error.”). 




mass, standard form contracting.”125 Thus, the traditional vices of 
consent—error, fraud, and duress126—may not be up to the task of policing 
all forms of modern adhesion contracts. As a result, the common law 
doctrine of unconscionability may be useful to add clarity to the 
application of broader principles that underlie the traditional vices of 
consent, such as preventing unfair surprise and oppression, abuse of right, 
equity, and good faith.127 This may be an acceptable approach for courts 
faced with the evolving problems of adhesion contracts, who—in the 
words of Saleilles—may “go beyond the Code, but through the Code.”128 
Although there are tolerable arguments on either side of this debate, it 
is important to step back and evaluate the approach used to determine the 
fit of the doctrine of unconscionability in Louisiana’s civil law legal 
system. Because this Comment has identified that the legal problem of 
adhesion contracts has an impact on the structural integrity of contract law 
generally, the proposed solutions must be tested for coherency before they 
can be tested for competency. This is not to say that one should never look 
for the best solution. Instead, one must determine whether a proposed 
solution is in the realm of legal possibility before determining whether a 
proposed solution is ideal.  
III. TESTING THE COHERENCY OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: 
THE FOUNDATIONAL METHOD 
Once a proposed solution to an established legal problem has been 
evaluated, its coherency must be tested. For this reason, the third step in 
the foundational approach is to use the “foundational method” to test the 
coherency of the proposed solution with the legal systems under 
consideration. This method involves a deductive process. First, the 
comparativist must identify a philosophical foundation of each legal system, 
which is essentially a theoretical basis for the legitimacy of all governmental 
action. Second, the comparativist must derive general principles from the 
philosophical foundation. To qualify as general principles (rather than 
narrow policy objectives), such principles must be individually cogent and 
collectively coherent. Third, the comparativist must illustrate how the 
                                                                                                             
 125. Niswanger, supra note 123, at 526. 
 126. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1948 (“Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, or 
duress.”). 
 127. Niswanger, supra note 123, at 535. 
 128. Moreteau, supra note 112, at 289 (quoting Raymond Saleilles, Preface to 
FRANCOIS GENY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF (1913)). This 
idea embodies the nature of a civil code, which is meant to provide for general 
rules that have the flexibility to adjust to the needs of an evolving society. 




general principles guide existing legal institutions and, thereby, connect 
the legal system to its philosophical foundation. Finally, the comparativist 
must evaluate whether the proposed solution is consistent with the general 
principles and, if so, to what extent. At this point, the fruits of the second 
step of the foundational approach are put into effect by comparing the 
guiding principles of the proposed solution with the general principles of 
the legal system. This Part applies the “foundational method” to test the 
coherency of the doctrine of unconscionability with the common law legal 
system and the Louisiana civil law legal system. 
For this application of the foundational method, the first challenge is 
to establish the starting point of the inquiry—the philosophical foundation 
of the legal system. With this foundation in place, it will eventually be 
possible to complete two tasks: (1) determining the coherency of the 
doctrine of unconscionability with a legal system,129 and (2) deriving other 
practical solutions to the problems associated with adhesion contracts 
directly from the general principles of the legal system itself.130 In other 
words, distilling the philosophical foundation of a particular legal system will 
yield both comparative benefits and constructive benefits.  
The philosophical foundation of a legal system is a justification for the 
legitimacy of governmental authority that exists in the abstract. Consequently, 
to be precise, the challenge is not to find the philosophical foundation but 
instead is to find a plausible philosophical foundation that can act as a useful 
tool to derive general principles and, in turn, determine the coherency of legal 
institutions.131 In short, the philosophical foundation is an intellectual tool that 
has a practical purpose—maintaining the structural integrity of a legal 
system when discussing the utility of particular legal institutions, such as 
the doctrine of unconscionability. 
                                                                                                             
 129. See, e.g., infra Part III.C. 
 130. See, e.g., infra Part IV. 
 131. There are two primary reasons for not concerning oneself with the actual 
philosophical foundation of a legal system here. First, to establish the actual 
philosophical foundation of a particular legal system would involve a rigorous 
historical and cultural evaluation that would unduly distract from the immediate 
question—the coherency of a particular legal institution. Second, although a 
separate debate about the proper philosophical foundation of a particular legal 
system is always an option, if the philosophical foundation is plausible, it is highly 
unlikely that the ultimate conclusion of the method will be different. It is 
important to remember that the philosophical foundation’s plausibility will be 
tested by comparing its general principles with existing legal institutions in the 
respective legal system. Thus, there will be little difference in the practical 
implementation of the foundational approach when using different plausible 
philosophical foundations. 




Social contract theory provides such a tool for both the civil law and 
the common law. This is not to say that social contract theory is the 
historical foundation of these legal systems.132 Instead, social contract 
theory provides a base from which one can build up a coherent 
understanding of these legal systems and, thereby, determine the fit of the 
doctrine of unconscionability within the broader context of the law. Before 
getting into the mechanics, the reader must understand some essential 
features of social contract theory, a theory brought up in the Cartesian 
tradition.133 
                                                                                                             
 132. This Comment purposefully ignores the contemporary forms of social 
contract theory that grew up in the Kantian tradition. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 133. To understand social contract theory, one must understand the intellectual 
approach of the Rationalists. In 1641, René Descartes famously contemplated the 
basis for all of his beliefs and asked, “how do I know there is not something . . . 
concerning which there is not even the slightest occasion for doubt?” RENÉ 
DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy in which the Existence of God and 
the Distinction Between the Soul and the Body are Demonstrated, in DISCOURSE 
ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 63 (Donald A. Cress 
trans., 4th ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (1641) (describing his task as applying 
himself “earnestly and unreservedly to [the] general demolition of [his] 
opinions”). To answer this question, Descartes assumed that everything he 
“knew” or had ever “known” was an illusion—perhaps brought about by a 
perpetual dream, insanity, or an evil demon—to find whether there was a 
perceptible but undeniable truth. Id. For Descartes, epistemological reliance on 
sense perceptions was inherently flawed, because distinguishing between truth 
and illusion was practically impossible as a result of the very nature of the senses. 
Id. at 60 (“Surely whatever I had admitted until now as most true I received either 
from the senses or through the senses. However, I have noticed that the senses are 
sometimes deceptive; and it is a mark of prudence never to place our complete 
trust in those who have deceived us even once.”). Instead, Descartes relies on what 
he sees as the first undeniable truth: “I am, I exist.” Id. at 64.  
With the aid of reason, this truth could then be used as a foundation for all 
knowledge as a collection of immutable truths. For example, Descartes derives 
from the truth of his existence that, inter alia, he is a thinking thing and his 
perceptions, as far as they exist within him, also exist. Id. at 70. Other Rationalists 
would embrace this approach, seeking to deduce practical insights from general 
principles. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C. B. Macpherson ed., 
Penguin Books 1985) (1651). 




A. The Basics of Social Contract Theory  
Following the analytical method developed by René Descartes,134 
Thomas Hobbes—the “founding father of social contract theory”135—
sought to strip the study of political thought of any dressing of religious, 
cultural, moral, or academic bias.136 By suggesting that the legitimacy of 
a legal system should be analyzed in the context of human nature and 
epistemological limitations, Hobbes challenged the dominant view of 
Aristotle that human beings are political animals by nature and the 
legitimacy of government is a product of natural order.137 Ultimately, 
                                                                                                             
 134. René Descartes was a seventeenth century philosopher and mathematician 
and is considered to be the “founder of modern philosophy.” BERTRAND RUSSELL, 
HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 511 (Routledge Classics 2004) (1946). By 
attempting to “construct a complete philosophic edifice de novo,” Descartes 
distinguished himself from his predecessors, who could be seen as merely 
teaching in the ancient Grecian tradition. Id.  
In particular, Descartes’s approach revolutionized political thought and legal 
theory during the Enlightenment. See James V. Schall, Cartesianism and Political 
Theory, 24 REV. POLITCS 260, 260 (1962) (“After Descartes, the scientific and 
mechanical orientations of thought replaced the traditional Christian and 
Aristotelian molds in which politics had been considered.”). In fact, Descartes’s 
work, like that of other philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, is largely 
considered a direct attack on the Aristotelian tradition, which dominated political 
thought before 1650. See Michael Edwards, Aristotelianism, Descartes, and 
Hobbes, 50 HIST. J. 449, 458 (2007) (“Although almost all recent research points 
in some way to the complexity, significance, and diversity of the Aristotelian 
tradition, it is equally clear that the novatores themselves did not always 
appreciate these qualities, partly because of their anti-scholastic prejudices, and 
partly because, in many cases, this was a tradition they first encountered (and 
perhaps imperfectly understood) in their youth. Descartes’s own reading of his 
Aristotelian context was resolutely blunt. He insisted that ‘I do not think that the 
diversity of the opinions of the scholastics makes their philosophy difficult to 
refute. It is easy to overturn the foundations on which they all agree, and once that 
has been done, all their disagreements over detail will seem foolish.’” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 135. See S.A. LLOYD, MORALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES 252 
(2007). 
 136. Hobbes’s Leviathan, supra note 133, was his landmark attempt to develop a 
true “science of politics.” See generally Stephen Finn, Thomas Hobbes: Methodology, 
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/hobmeth/#H2 [https: 
//perma.cc/MY47-V5BW] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (discussing the methodology 
used in Thomas Hobbes’s political theory). 
 137. See ARISTOTLE, Politics, in SELECTED WORKS 561 (Hippocrates G. 
Apostle & Lloyd P. Gerson trans., 3d ed., Peripatetic Press 1991). 




Hobbes revolutionized how theorists viewed the legitimacy of governmental 
action by inquiring into the life of mankind without government.138 
1. The State of Nature 
Before delving into the nuances of social contract theory, one must 
consider a thought experiment: Imagine a world with no social relations, 
no culture, no legitimate governing authority, and no law. In this “state of 
nature”—a theoretical time before the birth of the social organization—
each person has the natural liberty to do as he or she pleases.139 The only 
limits on this natural liberty are products of natural law: the physical 
ability of the actor and the actor’s inclinations (which are inherently self-
interested).140 Because there is no common authority to resolve conflict or 
determine how limited resources are allocated, life in the state of nature is 
very insecure.141  
2. The Social Contract 
For the proponent of social contract theory, the state of nature is so 
undesirable that a priori all people would choose to give up their natural 
                                                                                                             
 138. See HOBBES, supra note 133, at 183–88. 
 139. Id. at 187–89. 
 140. Id. at 187. 
 141. Although all social contract theorists agree that the state of nature is not 
ideal, they do not agree on the degree of undesirability. Compare id. at 186 
(“Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is 
Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live 
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall 
furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the 
fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, 
nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious 
Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much 
force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no 
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of 
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”), 
with LOCKE, supra note 11, at 108 (“And here we have the plain ‘difference 
between the state of nature and the state of war;’ which, however some men have 
confounded, are as far distant as a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance and 
preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction, are 
one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common 
superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of 
nature.”). 




liberty in exchange for the security of political order.142 This idea 
represents the fundamental motivation for the social contract, which is the 
basis of legitimate governmental authority and, more generally, a 
legitimate legal system. Under this idea, only the consent of the governed 
can legitimize the state and its laws.143 Any other source of authority does 
not create mutual interests in the preservation of the state and thus the state 
of nature persists.  
The binding nature of the social contract is not a matter of morality 
per se but is instead a result of reason.144 People willingly join together 
and stay together in a political community, because their interests compel 
them to do so. Because individuals are not able to act contrary to their 
perceived self-interests, the force of consent is a matter of natural law. 
Thus, sincere consent is the fundamental prerequisite for the assumption 
of intrinsically binding legal duties (in both public law and private law), 
but the nature and scope of consent are subject to different interpretations. 
3. Perspectives on the Social Contract 
Although the above principles unite social contract theories, theorists 
disagree on the nature and scope of individual assent to the social contract. 
                                                                                                             
 142. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 133, at 190 (noting the “Second Law of 
Nature” is “[t]hat a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for 
Peace, and defense of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right 
to all things; and be contended with so much liberty against other men, as he 
would allow other men against himselfe.” (emphasis in original)). 
 143. See William A. Edmundson, Politics in a State of Nature, 26 RATIO JURIS 
149, 151 (2013) (“The state-of-nature tradition is committed to the view that 
political obligation is fundamentally voluntaristic. It rejects the classical notion 
that the state stands in loco parentis, and that political obligation is non-
voluntaristic in much the same way that filial obligation is non-voluntaristic. For 
the state-of-nature tradition, voluntary consent is the ‘gold standard’ by which 
state claims to legitimate authority are to be judged. This sets the bar rather high, 
and reaching it requires that the state structure be such that it can command 
universal, free assent, at least at some level of abstraction.”). 
 144. In contrast, Aristotle saw promise-keeping as a virtue that made a person 
especially well-suited to his ends. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 75 (Joe 
Sachs trans., Focus Publ’g 2002). Thomas Aquinas and other late scholastics 
elaborated on this virtue and concluded that one must keep his or her promises as 
a matter of moral or “natural” law. See generally JAMES GORDLEY, THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 10–29 (1991) 
(discussing the contributions of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to the legal 
synthesis achieved by the late scholastics in the sixteenth century). 




For Thomas Hobbes145 and John Locke,146 individuals join together for the 
sole purpose of protecting individual property interests (broadly 
defined).147 In contrast, for Jean-Jacques Rousseau,148 individuals join 
together to form a common interest, which is protected by the group 
collectively.149 The key difference is whether the legitimacy of the 
governing authority is derived from either the means of the social 
contract—i.e., the individual’s consent to be governed—or the ends of the 
social contract—i.e., the unification of individuals in society and the 
formation of the general will. As the remainder of this Part will illustrate, 
the implications of these different “perspectives” on the social contract are 
reflected in the Louisiana civil law and Anglo-American common law and 
can serve as the basis for the foundational method’s evaluation of the 
doctrine of unconscionability’s coherency with those legal systems.150 
                                                                                                             
 145. See generally Garrath Williams, Thomas Hobbes: Moral and Political 
Philosophy, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/ 
[https://perma.cc/24ZS-Y7WK] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (discussing the life 
and works of Thomas Hobbes). 
 146. See generally Patrick J. Connolly, John Locke (1632–1704), INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/locke/ [https://perma.cc/BSC8-
FRTF] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (discussing the life and works of John Locke). 
 147. See infra Part III.B. 
 148. See generally James J. Delaney, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), 
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/rousseau/ [https://perma.cc 
/F4TE-VGX5] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (discussing the life and works of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau). 
 149. See infra Part III.C. 
 150. This Part utilizes two “perspectives” on the social contract as philosophical 
foundations of the civil law and common law legal systems for three reasons. For 
one, the “ends-focused perspective” and the “means-focused perspective” on the 
social contract suggest general principles that, in turn, can be used to develop a 
coherent set of legal institutions. Thus, each satisfies the technical requirements of 
a philosophical foundation. In addition, the “ends-focused perspective” and the 
“means-focused perspective” on the social contract connect well with the civil law 
and common law legal systems respectively. Thus, each satisfies the plausibility 
requirement of a philosophical foundation. Finally, the “perspectives” on the 
social contract are particularly useful for analyzing the legitimacy of adhesion 
contracts, because the requirements of a legitimate social contract apply a fortiori 
to the legitimacy of private agreements under the social contract. Thus, each 
“perspective” will be practically useful for determining the coherency of proposed 
solutions to the problems associated with adhesion contracts, such as the doctrine 
of unconscionability. They are intellectual tools with a practical purpose—
maintaining the structural integrity of a legal system when discussing the utility 
of particular legal institutions. 




B. Application of the Foundational Method to the Common Law 
The “foundational method” (the third step in the “foundational 
approach”) can be applied to the common law to determine whether the 
doctrine of unconscionability is coherent with the Anglo-American 
common law legal system. The mechanics of this process are as follows. 
First, the means-focused perspective on the social contract is employed as 
a philosophical foundation of the common law legal system, suggesting 
the theoretical source of all legitimate governmental action and, a fortiori, 
all legitimate private action as enforced through contract law.151 Second, 
to facilitate a practical application of this theoretical source of legitimacy, 
the means-focused perspective on the social contract is used to derive general 
principles.152 Third, these general principles guide the development of 
coherent legal institutions that parallel mainstay institutions characterizing the 
common law, indicating that general principles derived from the means-
focused perspective are—for practical purposes—general principles of the 
common law.153 Fourth, by comparing the general principles of the common 
law with the guiding principles of the doctrine of unconscionability, the 
foundational method tests the coherency of the doctrine of unconscionability 
with the common law legal system.154 Although this method involves an 
abstraction away from the immediate problem at hand, such an abstraction 
is necessary to determine the place of the doctrine of unconscionability in 
the broader context of the common law as a coherent legal system. 
1. A Philosophical Foundation of the Common Law Legal System 
For the common law to be considered a coherent legal system, there 
must be a philosophical foundation that serves both as the source of 
legitimacy of all governmental action and as the antecedent that dictates 
the relationship among particular legal institutions. As a result, before 
determining the coherency of the doctrine of unconscionability with the 
common law, it is necessary to identify a philosophical foundation for the 
common law. Social contract theory is useful for this purpose, because the 
social contract signifies the beginning of a legitimate government. Thus, 
one may examine the nature of the social contract to determine the 
continued legitimacy of both governmental action and private actions that 
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as a matter of law. 
 152. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 153. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 154. See infra Part III.B.4. 




are legally enforceable. This inquiry involves a fundamental question: why 
would individuals forfeit their respective natural liberty and submit to the 
authority of a political state? 
One answer to the question of why individuals forfeit their respective 
natural liberty and join the social contract is focused on the “means” of 
social organization: autonomous individuals join together in an organized 
community to protect their individual natural rights from the arbitrary 
interference of the interests of others, both inside and outside that 
community, and thus any exercise of authority by that community over 
individuals must be consistent with the scope of their consent.155 This 
Comment views this perspective as “means-focused” in that the logical 
implications of the social contract must be consistent with the means of 
social organization—the consent of the people. The implications of the 
means-focused perspective make it a plausible philosophical foundation 
of the common law as a coherent legal system.156 
The means-focused perspective suggests limits on the scope of 
legitimate governmental action. From this perspective, the only purpose 
of social organization is the protection of broadly defined “property 
rights,”157 and there is no greater end to social organization.158 The social 
                                                                                                             
 155. This statement reflects this Comment’s broad characterization of the 
social contract theories expounded by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, supra note 
133, and John Locke in Two Treatises of Government, supra note 11.  
 156. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 157. For Hobbes, the overwhelming aversion of mankind is the fear of death. 
See HOBBES, supra note 133, at 189 (“A Law Of Nature, (Lex Naturalis,) is a 
Precept, or general Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, 
that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the 
same; and to omit, that, which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”). This idea 
led Hobbes to believe that individuals could logically submit to a despotic leader 
as long as that leader kept them relatively safe from outsiders and each other. See 
id. at 228–39 (discussing the rights of the sovereign by institution). In contrast, 
Locke broadened the interests of mankind to general property interests in life, 
liberty, and estates. LOCKE, supra note 11, at 155. Locke criticized Hobbes’s line 
of reasoning, which suggested “men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid 
what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay 
think it safety, to be devoured by lions.” Id. at 140. Regardless, for both Hobbes 
and Locke, from the individual’s point of view the purpose of social organization 
is to protect that which is the object of his rational interests, what this Comment 
calls “broadly defined property rights.” 
 158. Compare LOCKE, supra note 11, at 141, 155 (“The great and chief end, 
therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
government, is the preservation of their property.”), with ROUSSEAU, supra note 
9, at 148 (“Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the 




contract does not involve the abandonment of one’s private interests, and 
thus the general interest is merely a collection of distinct private interests.159 
As a result, the people always retain the natural right to resist governmental 
action that arbitrarily infringes on their right to self-preservation.160 Where 
government action exceeds the scope of the consent of the governed, that 
action is without the foundation for its legitimacy, the social contract is 
dissolved, and moral duties brought about by positive law are 
extinguished.161 Therefore, the legitimacy of government action, whether 
the creation of law or the enforcement of a “contract,” is inseparable from 
the consent of those governed by the action.162 
This idea is useful for the present inquiry into the problems associated 
with adhesion contracts, because the legitimacy of governmental action 
informs the legitimacy of private action, or, more precisely, the 
enforcement of private action (i.e. private law). In fact, the legitimacy of 
governmental action precedes the legitimacy of the enforcement of private 
action. As a result, the means-focused perspective on the social contract 
can be applied a fortiori to private agreements between members of the 
community. When individuals in a community sincerely consent to an 
agreement between themselves, the agreement is a priori in their perceived 
private interests and thus is binding as a matter of reason. In addition, 
because the very purpose of government from the means-focused 
perspective is to protect property interests broadly defined, the community 
has an interest in enforcing the valid agreement lest one party arbitrarily 
exercise authority over another when circumstances change and, thereby, 
disturb the reason why the latter entered into the social contract. 
Although logically sound, this subjective notion of consent presents 
practical problems, such as whether there is actual consent or merely the 
illusion of consent.163 For example, objectively determining whether a 
                                                                                                             
supreme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each member as an 
indivisible part of the whole.” (emphasis in original)).  
 159. See LOCKE, supra note 11, at 156–57. 
 160. Id. at 200–01; see also HOBBES, supra note 133, at 353. 
 161. See HOBBES, supra note 133, at 353, 375; LOCKE, supra note 11, at 202–03. 
 162. When focusing on the means of social organization, this Comment sees 
the social contract as a “mark of autonomy”—the ultimate example that the 
legitimacy of government is based on the continued consent of its people. 
 163. With respect to the legitimacy of governmental action, this question is 
less of a concern, because the social contract is not thought to be an explicit 
contract but instead a theoretical agreement from which the law derives a moral 
force. In the interest of pragmatism, proof of the continued subjective consent of 
the entire population is neither necessary nor desirable. With respect to the 
legitimacy of private agreements, however, the objective manifestation of consent 




standard form contract that is signed by a party actually reflects the signer’s 
subjective consent is impossible. This is a problem, because, as social 
contract theorists suggest, only subjective consent is inherently binding as a 
matter of logic.164 When government enforces agreements lacking 
subjective consent, both the agreement and the action of enforcement is 
illegitimate. When such illegitimate action is conducted on a larger scale, 
the legitimacy of the entire legal system is threatened. For this reason, legal 
institutions that determine what agreements should be enforced (for 
example, the doctrine of unconscionability) must be guided by general 
principles that are derived directly from the philosophical foundation of the 
legal system. 
2. General Principles of the Common Law 
The means-focused perspective on the social contract suggests a 
number of general principles, which will be useful for comparing foreign 
legal institutions with and deriving practical legal institutions for the 
common law as a coherent legal system. Specifically, the means-focused 
perspective on the social contract suggests four general principles that are 
especially informative when analyzing the common law’s enforcement of 
contracts in general and adhesion contracts in particular. 
First, the means-focused perspective on the social contract is 
characterized by complete skepticism of human nature. From the means-
focused perspective, not only is there no room for altruism but also there 
is no relinquishment of one’s individual self-interests in favor of a broader 
societal interest.165 Thus, there is no reason to believe that any particular 
individual would sacrifice his or her private interests in order to achieve 
some other goal, such as the administration of justice or the promotion of 
the public good. In fact, such a sacrifice would be inconceivable in light 
of human nature.166  
Second, the means-focused perspective on the social contract is 
characterized by disdain for the necessity of government. With complete 
skepticism of human nature comes the need to suppress individual self-
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subjective intent.  
 164. As Locke recognized, people will not rebel or see an authority as 
completely illegitimate for isolated injustices. See LOCKE, supra note 11, at 201–
02. When those injustices reach a critical mass, however, the legitimacy of 
government and the law is threatened. Id. 
 165. HOBBES, supra note 133, at 353–54, 375. 
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interests insofar as those self-interests interfere with the rights of others.167 
Thus, government is a necessary evil.168 On the one hand, government 
promulgates rules that limit one’s freedom, acting as a cage to contain self-
interests. On the other hand, it promulgates rules to protect an individual 
from the interests of others, acting as a shield from self-interests. Although 
this arrangement is more desirable than the state of nature, it evokes 
disdain because it is not ideal from any particular individual’s standpoint 
for three reasons. First, government has no higher purpose than to act as a 
shield and a cage of individual self-interests.169 Second, the individual 
must pay the price of a functioning government, which requires a 
significant amount of resources.170 Finally, the concentration of power in 
the hands of governmental officials leaves the citizen vulnerable to 
potential abuses.171 This last problem in particular suggests a need for 
certain safeguards. 
Third, the means-focused perspective on the social contract is 
characterized by a focus on predictability and the freedom from arbitrary 
authority. For government to be effective—or even tolerable—one must 
be able to advocate for his or her individual self-interests with the same 
vigor as all others.172 This concern is a matter of equality of opportunity, 
not equality of outcome.173 Because all individuals are expected to act in 
accordance with their respective self-interests and there is no greater 
purpose of government than to promote individual property interests 
broadly defined, any attempt by a government to favor one individual’s 
advocacy rights over another must be a result of bias. Predictability and 
freedom from arbitrary authority ensures a solid foundation for equality of 
opportunity or, more precisely, equality of advocacy.174 
Fourth, the means-focused perspective on the social contract is 
characterized by the predominance of individual liberty interests. As a 
matter of logic, if legal institutions are to remain true to the social contract, 
those institutions must be predominantly concerned with the individual 
liberty interests of the members of the community, whose consent is the 
basis for all legitimacy.175 For the means-focused perspective on the social 
contract, there is no greater end to social organization than to provide each 
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individual with protection from the private interests of others.176 Any 
broader notion of the “public welfare” should thus be equated to this 
promotion of general liberty interests. 
Without the uniting force of the means-forced perspective on the 
social contract, circumstances may suggest that these four principles are 
inconsistent. For example, the predominance of individual liberty interests 
would seem to suggest that a person should be “free” to consent to any 
boilerplate language that is presented in a standard-form contract. Because 
a person is also free to choose whether to read the language or seek outside 
counsel, it would follow that his or her choice not to do so is an exercise 
of free will, which should be respected as a matter of principle. In contrast, 
complete skepticism of human nature would suggest that there can be 
some agreements that are so onerous that no rational person would freely 
agree to their terms, and thus the objective manifestation of assent is but a 
ruse used by well-informed drafters to exploit the intentional ignorance of 
the law, which elevates form over substance. Although these general 
principles may sometimes be in tension, such tension is never inevitable 
when the principles derive from a common source. When faced with 
practical problems, the role of legal institutions is to both promote the 
general principles and maintain their coherency. This idea can be seen in 
legal institutions of the common law, for which the means-focused 
perspective forms a plausible philosophical foundation. 
3. The Connection Between the Common Law Legal System and the 
Means-Focused Perspective 
The general principles of the means-focused perspective yield legal 
institutions that parallel the mainstay institutions of the common law. As 
a result, the means-focused perspective can be seen—for all practical 
purposes—as a foundation for the common law as a coherent legal system. 
This connection will be useful for evaluating the coherency of new legal 
institutions with the overall common law legal system. Three features of 
the common law illustrate the connection between the legal system and the 
means-focused perspective. 
First, the means-focused perspective suggests the importance of an 
adversarial system of justice. Although complete skepticism of human 
nature may initially appear to preclude any attempt to establish a system 
of justice, the means-focused answer is not to suppress self-interest but 
instead to harness it. In this respect, it is easy to understand the common 
law support for the adversarial process, both in the functioning of the 
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courts and in the understanding of interpersonal contractual relations.177 
The common law relies on the adversarial system to produce just results, 
because there is no other logical alternative. Skepticism of human nature 
does not allow litigants to rely solely on the compassion of opposing 
counsel, the integrity of the court, the wisdom of the jury, or the 
obviousness of the law.178  
Second, the means-focused perspective suggests the need for 
procedural safeguards. Procedural safeguards in the courtroom and at the 
negotiating table ensure—to the greatest extent possible—that a given 
result will be predictable and that one will be free from the arbitrary 
authority of another. Complete skepticism of human nature makes paternal 
interventions dubious, and thus extra-procedural protections—such as 
rules of public order—should be treated with skepticism. In this respect, it 
is easy to understand the common law’s focus on procedural safeguards, 
especially in the adversarial process.179 The adversarial process promises 
a fair opportunity to advocate for one’s position, but it does not promise a 
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just result.180 To have such an opportunity, the process must be fair.181 For 
the process to be fair, procedural safeguards must limit parties, outsiders, 
and the judge, alike. 
Third, the means-focused perspective suggests the need to limit the 
power of public officials to give effect to private agreements. Skepticism 
of human nature and the disdain for the necessity of government imply 
that the public official should be viewed with increased suspicion, because 
he or she will often exercise significant authority. In this respect, it is easy 
to understand the common law’s view of the judge, who is both insulated 
from outside influences and authorized to exercise only limited judicial 
powers when the language of an agreement is clear.182 In addition, a 
predominance of individual liberty interests implies that an individual 
should be able to enter into any agreement she perceives to be in her self-
interests, but human nature suggests that one would not freely enter into 
an agreement in which she gives up something in exchange for nothing. 
Thus, only private agreements that are supported by consideration may be 
deemed a valid contract and enforced by the court, which may not 
substitute its own idea of a fair exchange for that which is evidenced by 
the objective manifestation of assent by the parties.183 
The above discussion is only a sample of the connection between the 
common law legal system and the means-focused perspective on the social 
contract. This connection is essential to the final step in the foundational 
method because the connection establishes that the general principles 
derived from the philosophical foundation are—for practical purposes—
the general principles of the legal system. Thus, in the final step, it is 
possible to compare the general principles of the legal system with the 
guiding principles of the proposed solution to determine that solution’s 
coherency. 
4. The Coherency of the Doctrine of Unconscionability with the 
Common Law Legal System 
The doctrine of unconscionability fits well in the common law legal 
system because the doctrine’s focus on the means of contractual assent 
mirrors the means-focused perspective on the social contract. For one, the 
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doctrine of unconscionability reflects a complete skepticism of human 
nature. Although the standard-form contract standing alone may satisfy 
the requirement of an objective manifestation of mutual assent, the 
doctrine of unconscionability allows courts to delve deeper into the 
procedure and substance of the agreement to find any unfair or oppressive 
behavior on the part of the drafter. This inquiry is warranted, because the 
drafter’s sole concern is naturally the promotion of its private interests. 
Second, the doctrine of unconscionability reflects disdain for the necessity 
of government and focuses on freedom from arbitrary authority. Although 
judges are empowered to determine the conscionability of contracts as a 
matter of law, strict application of procedural and substantive 
unconscionability objective standards act as a limitation on the judge’s 
discretion. Finally, the doctrine of unconscionability allows for individual 
liberty interests to prevail because it only invalidates a seemingly valid 
agreement if there is significant evidence that the consumer did not consent, 
preserving the reliability of an objective manifestation of mutual assent. 
Therefore, this application of the foundational method suggests the doctrine 
of unconscionability is readily coherent with the common law system.  
C. Application of the Foundational Method to the Civil Law 
The “foundational method” can also be applied to the civil law to 
determine whether the doctrine of unconscionability is coherent with the 
Louisiana civil law legal system. The mechanics of this process are similar 
to the application of the foundational method to the common law, which 
is detailed in the previous section. First, the ends-focused perspective on 
the social contract is employed as a philosophical foundation of the civil 
law legal system, suggesting the theoretical source of all legitimate 
governmental action and, a fortiori, all legitimate private action.184 Second, 
to facilitate a practical application of this theoretical source of legitimacy, 
the ends-focused perspective on the social contract is used to derive general 
principles. Third, these general principles guide the development of 
coherent legal institutions that parallel mainstay institutions that 
characterize the civil law, indicating that general principles derived from the 
ends-focused perspective are—for practical purposes—general principles of 
the civil law. Fourth, by comparing the general principles of the civil law 
with the guiding principles of the doctrine of unconscionability, the 
foundational method tests the coherency of the doctrine of 
unconscionability with Louisiana’s civil law legal system. As with the 
                                                                                                             
 184. See supra text accompanying note 151. 




previous section, this method involves an abstraction away from the 
immediate problem at hand. 
1. A Philosophical Foundation of the Civil Law Legal System 
For the civil law to be considered a coherent legal system, there must 
be a philosophical foundation that ensures both legitimacy and coherency. 
As a result, before determining the coherency of the doctrine of 
unconscionability with the Louisiana civil law, it is necessary to identify 
a philosophical foundation for the Louisiana civil law. As with the 
common law, social contract theory is useful for this purpose, because the 
social contract signifies the beginning of a legitimate government, and thus 
one may examine the nature of social contract to determine the continued 
legitimacy of governmental and private action.  
With respect to the source of a legal system’s legitimacy, a second 
answer to the question of why individuals forfeit their respective natural 
rights and join the social contract is focused on the “ends” of social 
organization: autonomous individuals join together in an organized society 
to unite their private interests to a greater common interest that is pursued 
and defended by the whole, and thus any legitimate exercise of authority 
by the society is limited to that which promotes the general welfare of the 
society.185 This Comment views this perspective as “ends-focused” in that 
the logical implications of the social contract must be consistent with the 
ends of social organization—the promotion of the general welfare as a 
distinct interest. The implications of the ends-focused perspective make it 
a plausible philosophical foundation of the Louisiana civil law as a 
coherent legal system. 
The ends-focused perspective suggests limits on the scope of 
legitimate governmental action. From this perspective, the purpose of 
social organization is to realize and enforce the common good, not merely 
to protect the private interests of the individuals who joined the social 
contract.186 The social contract involves the abandonment of one’s private 
interest, and thus the general interest is that which tends to promote the 
general welfare, not merely a collection of distinct interests.187 As a result, 
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the people do not retain any natural rights per se, because any legitimate 
exercise of authority by the society a priori promotes the general 
welfare.188 If the exercise of authority does not promote the general 
welfare (for example by promoting merely private interests), it is 
illegitimate, the social contract is dissolved, and the exercise of authority 
is not properly called the administration of “Law.”189 
When considering the source of a government’s legitimacy, the ends-
focused perspective can be contrasted with the means-focused perspective. 
When focusing on the means of social organization, the social contract is 
a “mark of autonomy”—the ultimate example that the legitimacy of 
government is based on the continued consent of its people. Thus, 
subjective consent alone yields legitimate authority. In contrast, when 
focusing on the ends of social organization, the social contract is a “mark 
of alignment”—the ultimate example that the legitimacy of government is 
based on the adherence to the general will. Although consent is an 
important means to the formation of the general will, subjective consent 
alone is not enough to legitimize authority over the consenter.190 There 
must be consent plus the realization of the cause of that consent.191 With 
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 190. Rousseau illustrates this point with the example of someone who 
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not consent—that forces the person to act accordingly. Thus, there is no duty to 
the “promisee” but instead only a “duty” to—or perhaps more precisely an 
inclination of—the promisor’s own self. 




respect to governmental action, the cause of consent is merely the mutual 
adherence to the general will.192  
This idea is useful for examining problems associated with adhesion 
contracts, because the legitimacy of governmental action informs the 
legitimacy of private action. The ends-focused perspective on the social 
contract can be applied by analogy to private agreements between subsets 
of the society. The same principles of consent apply; both sincere consent 
and the realization of the cause for the consent are necessary for the 
agreement to create binding “law” between the parties.193 If consent is to 
be binding as a matter of reason, the cause for the consent must be fulfilled.  
An essential limitation on private agreements under the ends-focused 
perspective is not imposed by the means-focused perspective: Individuals 
may create “laws” among themselves within society but only as long as 
those “laws” do not derogate from principles of the common good.194 The 
state cannot legitimately enforce an agreement that is inconsistent with the 
general will, and without state enforcement the agreement is neither 
theoretically nor practically binding.195 
Although logically sound, the subjective notions of consent and cause 
present practical problems, such as whether the actual cause was met or 
whether there was a cause at all. For example, it is impossible to 
objectively determine whether a standard form contract that is signed by a 
party actually reflects her subjective cause. This is a problem, because, as 
the ends-focused perspective suggests, there must be both subjective 
consent and realization of the cause for that consent in order to bind a 
person as a matter of logic.196 When government enforces agreements 
lacking such requirements, it is not only the agreement that is illegitimate 
but also the action of enforcement. When such illegitimate action is 
conducted on a larger scale, the legitimacy of the entire legal system is 
threatened. Thus, to maintain legitimacy, legal institutions must be guided 
by general principles that are derived directly from the philosophical 
foundation of the legal system. 
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2. General Principles of the Civil Law 
The ends-focused perspective on the social contract suggests a number 
of general principles, which will be useful for comparing foreign legal 
institutions with—and deriving practical legal institutions for—the 
Louisiana civil law as a coherent legal system. Specifically, the ends-
focused perspective on the social contract suggests four general principles 
that are particularly informative when analyzing the civil law’s 
enforcement of contracts generally and adhesion contracts in particular. 
First, the ends-focused perspective on the social contract is 
characterized by incomplete skepticism of human nature. In fact, the ends-
focused perspective on the social contract presumes that an individual is 
able to relinquish his or her private interests in favor of the general 
interests of society as a whole.197 For Rousseau, this presumption is 
essential to the social contract, which provides a solution to the 
fundamental problem of social organization: “Find a form of association 
which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods 
of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, 
nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”198 The 
social contract requires “the total alienation of each associate, together 
with all of his rights, to the entire community,” because this act creates an 
indivisible whole that promotes liberty, equality, and unity.199 
Second, the ends-focused perspective on the social contract is 
characterized by the theoretical nature of the sovereign. The sovereign is 
the unified society in action and is by definition only guided by the general 
will.200 This is a theoretically distinct entity, rather than a mere collection 
of individuals.201 Further, the sovereign is inalienable, indivisible, and 
absolute.202 In contrast, the absence of the sovereign implies the non-
existence of the society and illegitimacy of the state, regardless of whether 
a group of individuals has remained in proximity to one another.203 Thus, 
while the social contract represents the theoretical birth of society, the 
sovereign represents its continued life in the abstract. 
Third, the ends-focused perspective on the social contract is 
characterized by a focus on the practical realization of the general will. 
Because of the theoretical nature of the sovereign, truly realizing the 
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practical implications of the general will is difficult, if not impossible.204 
So, government is concerned with approximating the dictates of the 
general will to the extent practical, using governmental structure, 
procedure, and individual accountability.205 Practical limitations do not 
stifle the initial inquiry into abstract or subjective ideas. 
Fourth, the ends-focused perspective on the social contract is 
characterized by the predominance of societal interests over individual 
private interests. Although the promotion of individual private interests 
may appear to correlate with the common interests in certain 
circumstances, the concern for legitimate governmental action is always 
the approximation of the general will.206 In fact, law could be defined 
simply as “when the entire populace enacts a statute concerning the entire 
populace.”207 Thus, societal interests must always prevail over individual 
private interests.208 The only recourse for the aggrieved individual that 
finds his or her private interests in opposition to the general will is to either 
submit to the law or to break ties with the society and return to the state of 
nature.209  
These general principles of the ends-focused perspective can be used 
to derive legal institutions. These legal institutions can be used to address 
practical problems associated with the legitimacy of private and public 
action. In addition, because these legal institutions are derived from a 
common source (the ends-focused perspective on the social contract), they 
collectively create a coherent body of law that can properly be called a 
“legal system.” As this Comment suggests, the ends-focused perspective 
on the social contract acts as a sound philosophical foundation for the 
Louisiana civil law legal system. 
3. The Connection Between the Civil Law Legal System and the 
Ends-Focused Perspective 
The general principles of the ends-focused perspective yield legal 
institutions that parallel the mainstay institutions of the Louisiana civil 
law. As a result, the ends-focused perspective can be seen—for all 
practical purposes—as a foundation for the Louisiana civil law as a 
coherent legal system. This connection will be useful for evaluating the 
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coherency of new legal institutions with the overall Louisiana civil law 
legal system. Three features of the Louisiana civil law illustrate the 
connection between the ends-focused perspective and the Louisiana civil 
law. 
First, the ends-focused perspective suggests the importance of 
individuals adhering to a set of general citizenly duties. Incomplete 
skepticism of human nature allows—and the practical realization of the 
general will requires—individuals to distinguish between actions that 
promote one’s self-interests as an individual and actions that promote 
one’s self-interests as a member of the society.210 Although the 
maintenance of the state requires the individual to always choose the latter, 
it is impossible for the government—either through legislation or 
jurisprudence constante—to always guide the individual. Thus, there is a 
tension between, on the one hand, the need to ensure the promotion of 
societal interests over merely private interests and, on the other hand, the 
ability of the government to communicate exactly what that means 
beforehand. In this respect, it is easy to understand Louisiana civil law’s 
reliance on broad duties, such as the requirement of good faith.211 
Individuals are not only deemed to know the mandates of positive law but 
also must act—generally speaking—in a manner that is becoming of a 
member of society.212 In contrast with the common law, this broad duty 
lessens the needed for a strictly adversarial system, both as a procedural 
system of justice and as a general picture of interpersonal relations.213 
Second, the ends-focused perspective suggests the need for extra-
procedural protection of parties with weaker bargaining power. Because 
faith in human nature is incomplete and private interests may not 
supersede public interests, the law must prescribe rules of public order that 
promote the common good and may not be derogated by private 
agreement.214 These rules are not strictly procedural in nature; they create 
substantive bars on certain actions that would typically allow a party with 
a stronger bargaining position to take advantage of another. In this respect, 
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it is easy to understand Louisiana’s reliance on rules of public order that 
protect parties with weaker bargaining power in a transaction. For 
example, “[a] buyer is not bound by an otherwise effective exclusion or 
limitation of the warranty [against rehibitory defects] when the seller has 
declared that the thing has a quality that he knew it did not have.”215 Thus, 
any plain language in the contract to the contrary will be null, even if the 
parties agreed to that language in accordance with proper procedure.216 
Third, the ends-focused perspective suggests the need of judicial 
flexibility in the enforcement of private agreements. The general will is 
superior to any form of its manifestation.217 Neither legislation nor 
contract can derogate from the clear mandates of societal interests.218 In 
this respect, it is easy to understand the methods of interpretation in the 
Louisiana civil law legal system as well as the judge’s flexibility in 
utilizing them when enforcing (or not enforcing) private agreements. For 
example, a judge has the ability to disregard the plain language of a 
contract if it leads to an absurd consequence in light of public policy.219 
This ability recognizes the nature of the sovereign as an abstract entity, the 
practical difficulties of ascertaining the mandates of the general will, and 
the superiority of societal interests over private interests. Further, unlike 
the common law judge, the civilian judge may be trusted to reason beyond 
the words of the contract to a greater degree, because civilian skepticism 
of human nature is incomplete and allows for unselfish actions.220  
These examples show the connection between the Louisiana civil law 
legal system and the ends-focused perspective on the social contract. 
Unlike the means-focused perspective, the ends-focused perspective 
readily allows for key features of the Louisiana civil law: the role of 
general duties, the prevalence of rules of public order, and the role of the 
judge. This connection is essential to the final step in the foundational 
method, because the connection establishes that the general principles 
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derived from the philosophical foundation are—for practical purposes—
the general principles of the legal system. Thus, in the final step, it is 
possible to compare the general principles of the legal system with the 
guiding principles of the proposed solution to determine that solution’s 
coherency.  
4. The Coherency of the Doctrine of Unconscionability with 
Louisiana’s Civil Law Legal System 
The focus of the doctrine of unconscionability on the means of 
contractual assent does not fit perfectly with the Louisiana civil law, which 
is more aligned with the ends-focused perspective on the social contract.221 
For one, the ends-focused perspective reflects an incomplete skepticism of 
human nature, which suggests that individuals may agree to some terms 
for reasons other than merely private interests.222 Thus, while the law 
should be concerned with oppressive behavior, the means of contractual 
assent do not paint a complete picture of the relations of parties. Second, 
the theoretical nature of the sovereign and the focus on the practical 
realization of the general will suggest that the Louisiana civil law can look 
beyond the objective manifestation of mutual assent and delve deeper into 
the purpose of private agreements.223 Consequently, the civil law does not 
need to shy away from subjective inquiries, such as determining the actual 
reason why a drafter included a boilerplate term in a standard form 
contract. Third, the predominance of societal interests over individual 
private interests suggests that the law should not be concerned with 
protecting the integrity of a contract for the sake of the parties alone but 
instead for the sake of society’s interests in maintaining the legitimacy of 
the institution of contract.224 This idea suggests the civil law should be 
concerned with the broader societal ramifications of enforcing certain 
agreements. 
It is true that consent is one of the fundamental prerequisites for 
legitimate governmental action and the doctrine of unconscionability helps 
to protect the evidentiary value of the objective manifestation of consent.225 
But the civil law should not only be concerned with the objective 
manifestation of consent. As the ends-focused perspective illustrates, there 
should also be a concern for the reason or cause for the consent.226 So the 
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doctrine of unconscionability leaves something wanting in the civil law. 
Thus, Louisiana must look elsewhere for a coherent way of dealing with 
the legal problem of adhesion contracts that better reflects the general 
principles of the Louisiana civil law as a coherent legal system. 
IV. SECONDARY INQUIRY: A CIVILIAN ANSWER 
TO ADHESION CONTRACTS 
Once the primary inquiry into the coherency of a proposed solution is 
complete, one may conduct secondary inquiries to determine the “best” 
coherent solution to an established legal problem. Although these 
secondary inquires make up the fourth step in the foundational approach, 
they are neither uniform in application nor necessarily decisive of the 
overall inquiry.227 For example, the doctrine of unconscionability—
although readily coherent with the general principles of the Anglo-
American common law legal system228—leaves something wanting when 
compared to the general principles of the Louisiana civil law legal 
system.229 Therefore, that doctrine is not a completely coherent solution to 
the legal problem of adhesion contracts for that legal system. Under the 
fourth step, this result warrants a search for alternative solutions, which 
must mirror the general foundational approach. Illustrating this point, this 
Part argues that, although historically underutilized, the civil law 
requirement of cause presents an alternative coherent solution to the legal 
problem of adhesion contracts in Louisiana because it fits well with the 
ends-focused perspective on the social contract, which provides a sound 
philosophical foundation for the Louisiana civil law as a coherent legal 
system. 
A. The Proposed Solution: The Cause Element 
Because the legal problem of adhesion contracts has been established 
and the proposed solution of the doctrine of unconscionability has proved 
to be inadequate for Louisiana’s civil law legal system, it is necessary to 
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find a new proposed solution to test for coherency. While the doctrine of 
unconscionability can be useful for Louisiana courts—as it fits well with 
the requirement of consent in contractual formation230—the fact that a 
standard form contract is “conscionable” should not be the end of the 
inquiry in Louisiana. In addition to the requirement of valid consent, 
Louisiana law also requires another element for a contract to be 
enforceable that is relevant for most standard form consumer contracts—
cause.231 As with any proposed solution, the comparativist must trace the 
development of this element to determine its guiding principles and 
compare those principles with the general principles of the legal system 
under consideration. 
1. The Development of Cause 
The requirement of cause derives from a Roman law concept—
causa.232 Although there is debate over the practical use of causa under 
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Roman law, the postglossators Bartolus and Baldus understood causa in 
light of Aristotelian terminology and ethical theory.233 By the time these 
scholars fully developed the medieval doctrine of causa, it closely 
resembled two important Aristotelian ideas: liberality and commutative 
justice.234 Liberality—meaning to give “to the right people, the right 
amounts, and at the right time”—was reflected in the causa of gratuitous 
contracts, and commutative justice—meaning “to exchange so that neither 
party is enriched at the expense of the other”—was reflected in the causa 
of onerous contracts.235 Being ends of human existence, these virtues could 
be seen as logical and moral foundations for legal institutions. Thus, the 
moral principles could be seen as transcending Roman positive law and 
may be read into Canon law as a matter of natural equity.236 But this idea 
was mostly of theoretical, rather than practical, significance.237 
The concept of “cause” was given practical application in sixteenth-
century France. Although the scientific revolution of the Enlightenment 
hailed the replacement of Aristotelian virtues with moral principles based 
on the will, French jurists largely preserved the medieval doctrine of 
causa, relying heavily on the works of Domat and Pothier.238 The 
requirement of cause was codified in the French Civil Code in 1804: “An 
obligation without a cause or on a false cause or on an unlawful cause can 
have no effect.”239 This idea would be echoed in Louisiana a few years 
later in the Digest of 1808.240 
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2. The Use of Cause in Louisiana 
In Louisiana today, “[a]n obligation cannot exist without a lawful 
cause,”241 which is “the reason why a party obligates himself.”242 As a 
civilian concept, cause is distinguishable from the common law notion of 
consideration,243 which has a primarily evidentiary function under the 
objective theory of contract.244 In contrast, the requirement of cause is 
most useful today in its subjective context, because to consider only the 
objective cause of nominate contracts would render the doctrine of cause 
meaningless.245 For example, although a lender may have an objective 
cause for entering into the contract of loan (the recovery of the principal 
plus interest), the lender’s subjective cause may be more illicit (for 
example, to foster illegal gambling).246 Further, the cause of each party to 
a contract is significant and “[w]hether shared, common or not, any 
unlawful or immoral reason should carry with it the absolute nullity of the 
act of which it meant to be the ‘cause.’”247 This conclusion is a reflection 
of a guiding principle in the civil law: “[p]ersons may not by their juridical 
acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public 
interest.”248 
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3. The Broader Guiding Principles of Cause 
Although historically cause has only been invoked to invalidate 
contracts for illegal or non-existent causes in Louisiana,249 a broader 
application of the element is justifiable in light of its development in the 
Aristotelian tradition. Courts should not only invalidate contracts or terms 
for illegal or non-existent causes but also for causes that are generally 
against public policy.  
To justify this broader application of the cause requirement today, one 
may reformulate Aristotelian virtues in light of the ends-focused perspective 
on the social contract. Instead of being seen as ends in themselves, 
commutative justice and liberality can be seen as general principles that a 
priori promote the general welfare of society. In other words, the guiding 
principles of cause can be seen as aligned with the general principles 
derived from the ends-focused perspective on the social contract.  
Rousseau advocated a similar idea when he said: “If one enquires into 
precisely wherein the greatest good of all consists . . . it boils down to two 
principal objectives, liberty and equality. Liberty, because all particular 
dependence is that much force taken from the body of the state; equality, 
because liberty cannot subsist without it.”250 For Rousseau, liberty—as in 
“civil liberty”—meant the ability to have one’s actions limited only by the 
general will251 and equality meant that no individual have the power or 
wealth to unjustly limit the liberty of another.252  
In the private contract context, Rousseau’s promotion of liberty and 
equality can be seen as requiring the promotion the Aristotelian values of 
liberality and communicative justice, which are the foundation of the 
contractual requirement of cause. Without the value of communicative 
justice, there can be no equality, as the ability of one person to enrich 
himself or herself at the expense of another gives that person the power to 
unjustly limit the liberty of the other.253 Without the value of liberality, 
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there can be no liberty, because societal standards are necessary to guide 
the actions of private parties in a society if those actions are to be 
considered truly “free.”254 Thus, recognition of both Aristotelian values is 
necessary to promote the ends of social organization during contractual 
formation, which, in turn, is necessary to legitimize the enforcement of a 
contract under the ends-focused perspective.255 
Expanding this idea, contracts, to the extent that they are enforceable, 
should only be entered into with a sociable intent that gives deference to 
the common good and does not take advantage of another’s incapacities. 
Thus, contracts must have a sociable cause, reflecting the principle—
common to both Aristotelian virtue and the ends-focused perspective on 
the social contract—that the law cannot support an action that derogates 
from the common good.  
B. Application of the Foundational Method 
The broader use of the requirement of cause fits well with the ends-
focused perspective on the social contract and thus can be seen as a 
coherent legal institution of the Louisiana civil law legal system. First, the 
cause requirement echoes the incomplete skepticism of human nature by 
suggesting that parties can have both cooperative and uncooperative 
reasons for entering into a contract.256 Second, the cause requirement 
recognizes that private agreements, although valid on their face, may still 
have a purpose that deviates from the common good, making them 
unenforceable by legitimate governmental action.257 Third, the cause 
requirement recognizes that the civil law does not have to shy away from 
the difficult task of determining subjective goals. Just as the legislature 
must determine the common good in the abstract, the judge must 
determine the subjective intent of private actors. Practical concerns are met 
with techniques, such as the use of reason, that are meant to best 
approximate the theoretical ideal. 
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C. The Doctrine of Unsociability 
The broader application of cause can be applied with precision to the 
problems of adhesion contracts. Adhesion contracts present significant 
ambiguities concerning the drafter’s intent when particular terms are 
included. The more contracts move away from the essential terms that give 
rise to obligations, the greater the likelihood that the cause of each 
obligation will not be readily apparent. For example, a consumer may enter 
into a contract of sale with an automobile dealership to purchase a car. The 
objective cause of the seller is readily apparent—the purchase price. Any 
alternative cause is not likely to be of concern to the buyer, who may 
appeal to the justice system to correct most wrongs. But, if the seller 
requires the buyer to sign an agreement with numerous other provisions, 
questions arise. What is the cause for requiring arbitration in the event of 
a disagreement (does the seller merely want to limit the available remedies 
of the buyer)? What is the cause for waiving a warranty (does the seller 
know the car is a lemon)? What is the cause for a forum selection clause 
(does the seller want to make it financial infeasible for the buyer to enforce 
basic rights)?  
Thus, the cause element of a contract can present a second hurdle for 
adhesion contracts. Such contracts may not only have to be “conscionable” 
but also “sociable.” A contract would be “unsociable” when the cause of 
its terms is against good morals, public order, or express law. In other 
words, the cause for the party’s consent is inconsistent with the ends of 
social organization. It tends to disrupt the unity of society by seeking to 
promote private interests over the general interests by, among other things, 
seeking to be enriched at the expense of another or ignoring the explicit 
mandates of the common good. This idea, especially in relation to the good 
morals and public order requirements, should be considered in light of the 
philosophical foundation of the civil law as seen through the ends-focused 
perspective of the social contract, which weighs all private action against 
the common good. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to give a detailed 
account of how the doctrine of unsociability could be implemented, courts 
may look to classes of boilerplate terms to see whether or not they have 
sociable causes supporting their enforcement. Does this particular term 
seek to limit the rights of the consumer without promoting real efficiency 
benefits? Does this particular term merely seek to inconvenience the 
consumer? Does this particular term derogate from the spirit of imperative 
laws? Can the purpose of this particular term be adequately served by gap-
filling provisions and is the choice between the term and the gap-filling 
provision of no social concern? These are fact-intensive questions that the 




civilian judge should be well-equipped to handle, assuming she keeps in 
mind the underlying foundation of the Louisiana civil law legal system. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment presents a new approach to comparative law—the 
“foundational” approach—that looks to the philosophical foundation of a 
legal system to determine the coherency of proposed solutions to legal 
problems. The application of the foundational approach to the doctrine of 
unconscionability reveals that it is a coherent solution to the legal problem 
of adhesion contracts for the common law legal system. The doctrine, 
however, is not completely coherent with the Louisiana civil law legal 
system. Accordingly, Louisiana courts should focus more attention on the 
cause requirement as a means of policing adhesion contracts, because the 
auxiliary boilerplate terms in such contracts often raise questions about the 
drafter’s subjective reason for including those non-essential terms. Illicit 
intentions have the potential to disrupt foundational principles of the civil 
law theory of conventional obligations, especially when they are 
effectuated on such a large scale. Thus, in addition to being 
“conscionable,” adhesion contracts in Louisiana must be “sociable,” 
reflecting the importance of adhering to good morals, public order and 
express law in contractual formation. This doctrine of unsociability can 
save the unwary consumer from the malicious boilerplate and, more 
importantly, maintain the coherency and legitimacy of Louisiana’s civil 
law legal system.  
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